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Abstract
This paper employs a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a finan-
cial market friction to rationalize the empirically observed negative relationship between
inflation and total factor productivity (TFP). Specifically, an empirical analysis of US
macroeconomic time series establishes that there is a negative causal effect of inflation on
aggregate productivity. Rather than taking the productivity process as exogenous, the
model is therefore set up to feature an endogenous component of TFP. This is achieved
by allowing physical investment to be channelled into two distinct technologies: a safe,
but return-dominated technology and a superior technology which is subject to idiosyn-
cratic liquidity risk. An agency problem prevents complete insurance against liquidity
risk, and the scope for insurance is endogenously determined via the relevant liquidity
premium. Since the liquidity premium is positively related to the rate of inflation, the
model demonstrates how nominal fluctuations have an influence not only on the overall
amount, but also on the qualitative composition of aggregate investment and hence on
TFP. The quantitative relevance of the underlying transmission mechanism which links
nominal fluctuations to TFP via corporate liquidity holdings and the composition of ag-
gregate investment is corroborated by means of the quantitative analysis of the calibrated
model economy as well as a detailed analysis of industry-level and firm-level panel data.
Notably, the empirical findings are consistent with both the properties of the agency
problem postulated in the theoretical model and its implications for corporate liquidity
holdings and physical investment portfolios.
∗email: mevers@uni-bonn.de, stefan.niemann@uni-bonn.de, marc.schiffbauer@uni-bonn.de. We are grateful
to Almut Balleer, Jo¨rg Breitung, Andrea Caggese, Martin Hellwig, Michael Massmann, Monika Merz and Ju¨rgen
von Hagen for valuable comments and helpful discussions. Needless to say, all remaining errors are our own
responsibility.
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1 Introduction
The starting point for this paper is the empirical finding of a negative relation between inflation
and total factor productivity (TFP), both at business cycle frequency and over longer horizons.
Economic interpretations of this correlation can pursue two ways, depending on the direction
of causality that is stressed. Indeed, in standard (complete markets) monetary business cycle
models featuring an exogenous productivity process and a quantity relation between money,
output and prices, it is the case that - ceteris paribus - a negative productivity shock is asso-
ciated with a higher rate of inflation. Hence, the premise in this class of models is a causal
negative effect of TFP on inflation. However, given that TFP is taken to be an exogenous
residual, this is an unsatisfactory situation; the reason is that we are left with a ”measure
of our ignorance” (Abramovitz, 1956) in order to explain economic processes of first priority.
This paper takes a different route. While we do not question the merits of the aforementioned
class of models for the purpose of studying macroeconomic dynamics, we reverse the underlying
notion of causality between inflation and TFP by proposing that the latter variable can be seen
as a function of the former one. This implies that TFP is no longer an exogenous residual, but
becomes an endogenous variable which is determined in the general equilibrium of the economy.
Empirically, the findings emerging from US aggregate time series data at quarterly and yearly
frequency provide robust evidence in favor of this hypothesis. In particular, higher inflation
is significantly found to negatively affect TFP(-growth), whereby the exogeneity of inflation
cannot be rejected; thus, there is evidence that the negative relation between inflation and
TFP is indeed due to a causal effect from inflation to TFP.
Against this background, the present paper concentrates on the supply-side effect of mone-
tary policy on TFP. Specifically, we argue that it is not appropriate to treat shocks to monetary
policy and aggregate technology as orthogonal. The transmission mechanism that we put for-
ward in order to rationalize the negative relationship between inflation and TFP is tied to
the composition and effectiveness (in a sense to be defined below) of aggregate investment.
To formalize our argument, we develop a model economy whose underlying structure is based
on the common point of departure of both business cycle and growth theory: the neoclas-
sical growth model. This basic model is modified along three dimensions. First, it features
a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint and incorporates the assumption of limited asset market
participation; this allows for liquidity effects and hence for non-neutrality of monetary policy
even in an environment with flexible prices. Second, the model does not involve a comprehen-
sive aggregate production function, but starts from the presumption that investment can be
channelled into two distinct technologies: a safe, but return-dominated (”basic”) technology
and a superior (”advanced”) technology which yields higher expected returns, but is subject
to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Agents operating the latter technology can insure themselves
against such idiosyncratic risk by means of holding a precautionary stock of readily marketable
assets. However, due to an entrepreneurial moral hazard problem, which is the third key build-
ing block of the model, the scope for insurance is limited. The consequence of this friction is
that financial markets are incomplete in that scarce liquidity cannot be optimally provided to
the productive sector. In particular, given that insurance against liquidity shocks is costly, vari-
ations in the costs of insurance trigger shifts in the composition of aggregate investment which
are associated with changes in TFP. In the model we put forward, these costs coincide with
the nominal interest rate. Specifically, in addition to its role with respect to the opportunity
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costs of consumption in a simple monetary cash-in-advance model, the nominal interest rate
works as a liquidity premium and thus constitutes an additional cost of production by means of
the advanced technology relative to the basic one. Hence, the model postulates a novel aspect
of monetary transmission in that movements in the nominal interest rate are associated with
changes in the composition of investment in the two available technologies.
In view of above arguments, it is evident that the present paper borrows from both business
cycle and growth theory: It considers monetary and technological shocks as well as their inter-
action with a specific financial markets friction, but at the same time endogenizes the aggregate
productivity process via an endogenous technology choice which is catalyzed by this friction.1
Here, we focus on the corresponding cyclical and steady state implications, but abstract from
the pertinent endogenous growth effects.2 Instead, we elaborate on the source of market in-
completeness which limits financial markets’ capability to provide liquidity to the corporate
sector. In particular, we detail a set of predictions regarding the interaction of variations in
the liquidity premium with certain supply-side characteristics at the industry level; moreover,
following Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998), we provide an explicit framework which illustrates how
these interaction effects can be endogenously derived from a particular entrepreneurial agency
problem. Hence, constrained-efficient contracting in the face of incomplete insurance against
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks delivers a number of implications concerning the reaction of the
productive sector to monetary policy shocks and the way in which industry-level characteristics
affect specific industries’ sensitivity to such shocks. Specifically, following movements in the
nominal interest rate, the response of industries which are more profitable and more exposed
to advanced technologies is predicted to be more pronounced.
In order to assess the quantitative and empirical relevance of the proposed transmission
mechanism, we adopt a twofold strategy: One the one hand, we interpret our model as a lit-
eral business cycle model and calibrate it to US data. The calibrated benchmark economy
is then compared to alternative economies whose basic structure is identical, but where either
monetary shocks are absent or the steady state rate of inflation is varied. Comparing the respec-
tive model-generated moments, we conclude (i) that, by generating an investment-composition
driven variation in TFP, monetary policy shocks can account for a significant proportion of
macroeconomic fluctuations, and (ii) that systematic changes in the level of inflation induce
sizeable changes in the level of TFP. On the other hand, in order to substantiate the empirical
relevance of our basic hypothesis that nominal fluctuations affect the composition of aggre-
gate investment, we complement our empirical findings pertaining to aggregate US data by
an analysis of disaggregate industry-level and firm-level panel data. In doing so, we provide
evidence consistent with (i) the implications of constrained-efficient contracting with respect
to the postulated agency problem, as well as (ii) the notion that corporate liquidity holdings
are used as a precautionary buffer stock to hedge investment into advanced technologies and
that the scope of such insurance is negatively affected by the level of inflation. We view these
findings as strongly supportive of our theory.
1For a similar approach, compare the recent paper by Aghion et al. (2006) who paraphrase the situation
as follows: ”The modern theory of business cycles gives a central position to productivity shocks and the role of
financial markets in the propagation of these shocks; but it takes the entire productivity process as exogenous.
The modern theory of growth, on the other hand, gives a central position to endogenous productivity growth and
the role of financial markets in the growth process; but it focuses on trends, largely ignoring shocks and cycles.”
2An endogenous growth perspective is adopted in Evers, Niemann and Schiffbauer (2007).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly synthesizes the
established empirical findings on the effects of inflation on economic performance and reviews
the related literature. Then, Section 3 provides detailed evidence on the relationship between
inflation and TFP in the US economy. Against this background, Section 4 proposes a business
cycle model as the theoretical framework for formulating our main hypotheses. Section 5
examines the quantitative properties of the calibrated benchmark economy as well as those of
alternative model economies. In Section 6, we undertake an empirical analysis of (panel) data
at different levels of aggregation in order to underpin our proposition that the composition
of aggregate investment is crucially affected by the firm-level conditions for insurance against
liquidity risk. A final section concludes, while some auxiliary information, including the explicit
derivation of the solution to the financial contracting problem, is relegated to the Appendix.
2 Related literature
Empirical literature: In line with the present paper’s focus, we organize our reading of the
relevant empirical work in two steps: First, we draw on the literature to provide evidence on the
relationship between inflation and economic performance, also shedding light on the respective
effects on factor accumulation and aggregate productivity. Second, we resort to evidence from
disaggregate firm-level data which provides valuable background information with respect to
the transmission mechanism proposed in this paper.
Applying cross-sectional and panel growth regressions for yearly data, Fischer (1993) finds a
negative correlation between inflation and economic growth.3 The author investigates the causal
mechanism behind this correlation in several ways. First, by considering sample variations
across periods predominated by demand (1960-1972) or supply (1973-1988) shocks, he examines
the potential endogeneity of inflation. He starts from the presumption that adverse supply
shocks are the main source of the potential endogeneity of inflation (while an adverse supply
shock is inflationary, an adverse demand shock would be deflationary). However, he finds that
the correlation between inflation and economic growth remains unchanged across the relevant
subsamples and is therefore led to the conclusion that inflation is exogenous with respect to
growth. Second, by means of a growth accounting exercise, Fischer decomposes GDP-growth
into its components and detects a robust negative relation between inflation on the one hand
and the growth rate of capital, but also of TFP on the other hand. These two results have
striking implications: They indicate that the negative correlation between inflation and GDP-
growth cannot be (exclusively) due to adverse technology shocks. And they demonstrate that,
even after controlling for factor accumulation and employment, the negative effect of inflation
on growth persists; that is, there must be some inflation-driven mechanism which records in
terms of decreased aggregate productivity.
The model we develop in Section 4 proposes that inflation, by making the provision of
liquidity more costly, affects investment in a way that shifts activity from superior to return-
3Other contributions include De Gregorio (1992, 1993), Barro (1996), Bruno and Easterly (1998) and Easterly
(2005). Generally, three potential mechanisms are put forward to rationalize the negative relationship: (i) the
adverse effects on economic performance of distortions in the informational content of the price level due
to aggregate uncertainty; (ii) the reduction in capital accumulation stemming from a temporary hold up of
investment decisions in the presence of aggregate uncertainty; (iii) the inflation tax on returns from capital and
R&D investment if investors must hold cash-in-advance.
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dominated, but safer technologies. A natural way to operationalize arguments concerning the
composition of aggregate investment is to use data on R&D expenditures to proxy investment
in superior technologies. Wa¨lde and Woitek (2004) report the overall level of R&D expenditure
to be procyclical. Conversely, Aghion et al. (2006) focus on the cyclical variation of R&D as a
share of total investment. On the basis of dynamic panel estimations, they find that the R&D
share and aggregate investment have markedly different business cycle properties, which hints
at the potential importance of a decomposition of aggregate investment in order to account for
business cycle phenomena.
At the disaggregate level, our study seeks to empirically assess how nominal fluctuations
impact on firms’ investment decisions when financial markets are incomplete.4 The basic take
of our theory is that the availability of corporate liquidity is a crucial determinant for firm-level
investment. To get some guidance on the potential power of this mechanism, we resort to the
findings in Opler et al. (1999) who examine the determinants and implications of holdings of
cash and marketable securities by publicly traded non-financial US firms.5 The authors es-
tablish that firms with better outside financing opportunities tend to hold a lower fraction of
their total assets in the form liquid assets, and that firms with strong growth opportunities and
riskier cash flows hold relatively high ratios of cash to total non-cash assets.6 Therefore, there
is evidence that firms retain a relatively high fraction of their earnings as liquid reserves and
that these reserves are generally not used for capital investment, but rather tend to be depleted
by operating losses, i.e. corporate liquidity is held as a hedge against production risk. As to
the quantitative importance of corporate cash holdings, the authors report the mean over the
firms in their sample of the ratio of cash to net assets at 18%, while the median amounts to 6%.
Thus, corporate liquidity holdings are likely to constitute a quantitatively relevant category for
the transmission of macroeconomic shocks and in particular of fluctuations in nominal variables
like the rate of inflation or the nominal interest rate. In the present paper we will elaborate on
this hypothesis.
Theoretical literature: Characterizing a theoretical framework for an empirically plausi-
ble monetary transmission mechanism is the subject of a large set of macroeconomic models set
up either in flexible or sticky price environments.7 Our own model presents a flexible price econ-
omy generating monetary non-neutrality via a CIA constraint and the additional assumption of
limited asset market participation;8 an important empirical phenomenon replicated in models
characterized by limited asset market participation is the liquidity effect, i.e. a fall in nominal
interest rates following an (unexpected) monetary expansion. We augment a simple monetary
model along these lines by a financial market friction which is motivated by an entrepreneurial
4For a review of the literature on corporate investment see Hubbard (1999).
5Most theoretical and empirical studies of corporate cash holdings start from the presumption that external
finance is costly and that firms hold liquid assets in order to survive bad times and to have funds readily available
if an investment opportunity arises. The benefits of corporate liquidity must then be balanced against its costs
which arises as a consequence of a liquidity premium.
6We interpret these latter features - high growth potential and risky cash flows - as the identifying charac-
teristics of what we label ”advanced” technology.
7Compare e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997, 2005) and the references therein.
8See Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1998) for monetary business cycle studies based on CIA constraints and Lucas
(1990), Fuerst (1992) or Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992, 1995) for developments of the limited participation
framework.
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moral hazard problem and gives rise to a well-defined corporate demand for liquidity. Starting
from the contribution by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), there is an extensive literature dealing
with the interaction of financial market frictions and the monetary transmission process. In
this context, the dynamics of corporate investment and the heterogeneity of firms’ responses
to monetary policy shocks have received particular attention.9 Here, we make no attempt to
systematically review this literature; instead, we concentrate on contributions developing some
of the aspects which feature prominently in our own model.
The key propagation mechanism we invoke to explain the negative relation between inflation
and TFP is an investment composition effect in the presence of incomplete financial markets.
In a real economy, Aghion et al. (2006) use a similar decomposition of aggregate investment in
order to examine how credit constraints affect the cyclical behavior of productivity-enhancing
investment. To that end, the authors develop a growth model where investment can be sunk into
either a short-term project or a long-term project which enhances future productivity. Impor-
tantly then, aggregate productivity has both an exogenous and an endogenous component. The
exogenous component is specified as in a conventional real business cycle model, whereas the
endogenous component is driven by the mass of long-term projects that have been successfully
completed in the past. Similar to our ”advanced” technology, survival of long-term projects
is uncertain because they are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks which - for reasons left
unspecified - can only be imperfectly insured. In this setup, the assumed stochastic structure
of aggregate shocks alters the amount of scarce resources available to insure idiosyncratic liq-
uidity risk in a procyclical fashion. As a consequence, the survival probability of any given
productivity-enhancing project is procyclical which generates an investment composition effect
giving rise to further procyclical momentum in the process for productivity growth and the
business cycle. Another paper concerned with the composition of aggregate investment when
financial markets are incomplete is Angeletos (2007). He studies the effects of idiosyncratic
investment risk on the aggregate level and the allocation of savings within the framework of a
non-monetary neoclassical growth model. One particular model variant considers the general
equilibrium properties of an economy where there is the choice of investing into either privately-
held risky projects or public equity, wherby the latter allows to pool idiosyncratic risks. One of
the model’s implications then is that, quite similar to what will happen in the model economy
developed in section 4, incomplete markets reduce TFP by shifting resources away from the
more risky, but also more productive private equity investment.
Both Aghion et al. (2006) and Angeletos (2007) are concerned with real general equilibrium
economies; hence, nominal aspects do not play any role. Moreover, in contrast to our own
model, the implications for the economy’s cyclical dynamics critically hinge on the assumption
that uninsured idiosyncratic investment risk evolves in a countercyclical fashion. The present
paper addresses both these issues at the same time. We set up a monetary business cycle model
to show how the effects of financial market frictions on the composition of physical investment
are shaped by the relative price for insuring superior investment activities, the nominal interest
rate. This nominal rate is affected by monetary fluctuations and is determined in the model’s
general equilibrium such as to equilibriate the supply of short-term credit by the household
sector with the demand for short-term credit from in the productive sector. Finally, in order to
9A selection of general contributions includes Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1996, 1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997); Cooley and Quadrini (2006), Fisher (1999) and Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994) are concerned with heterogenous firm dynamics.
6
better understand the determinants of the interaction between the nominal interest rate and the
scope for liquidity provision, we explicitly specify the source of market incompleteness which
gives rise to uninsured idiosyncratic risk.10 This allows us to derive a number of theoretical
predictions which can be empirically examined.
3 Empirical evidence on the relationship between infla-
tion and aggregate productivity
In this section, we use US time series data and adopt an instrumental variable approach to (i)
document how inflation and aggregate productivity are related at business cycle frequency and
to (ii) establish that the causal effect of inflation on TFP-growth is transmitted via corporate
portfolio choices. That is, we complement the work of Fischer (1993) by employing alternative
econometric methods and by examining the transmission channel in more detail. We exploit
both quarterly and yearly data since it is not a priori clear whether the effect of nominal
fluctuations on TFP fully materializes within a quarter.
As a starting point, we examine the interactions between TFP-growth and inflation at
the aggregate level. We employ the first difference of TFP rather than its level since our
methodology requires the inclusion of stationary variables.11 The TFP series is constructed
as the residual from the aggregate production function implied by the calibrated one-sector
neoclassical growth model to be set out in Section 4.12 Inflation is derived as the first difference
of the consumer price index.13 Moreover, we include GDP-growth and the private investment
share relative to GDP as additional endogenous variables. The rationale behind this is that
in standard monetary business cycle theories, the effect of inflation on real economic activity
(GDP-growth) is due to the adverse impact on aggregate investment of the inflation tax or
increased aggregate uncertainty associated with higher rates of inflation.14
Table 1 reports the results of an unrestricted VAR for quarterly and yearly frequencies
as well as the corresponding Granger causality tests. The information criteria suggest the
inclusion of a lag length of one in both cases;15 hence, the Granger causality test reduces to a
simple exclusion test of the first lag of the corresponding variable. The information contained
in Table 1 reveals that inflation reduces TFP-growth in the subsequent period at a quarterly
as well as a yearly frequency. This effect is significant on a 5% and 1% level, respectively, and
10Specifically, we embed the contracting problem discussed in Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998) into our business
cycle model. Kato (2006) adopts a similar approach, but in a real model. Meh and Quadrini (2006) consider a
model with endogenous market incompleteness with respect to individual investment risk.
11Indeed, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity (p-value of 0.623) if we apply an augmented
Dickey-Fuller test including a trend and two lags for US quarterly TFP data (167 observations).
12At yearly frequency, the correlation between the growth rates of our calibrated TFP-series and of the
relevant series published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is 0.89; quarterly series are not available from
the BLS. For further details, see Appendix C.
13The base year is 1995. We also employ the GDP deflator; however, we exclusively report the estimates
based on consumer prices since the results are very similar in both cases.
14See Cooley and Hansen (1989), Chari, Jones and Manuelli (1995), Jones and Manuelli (1990), Ramey and
Ramey (1995) or Stockman (1981) for a discussion of such theories.
15We stress that the negative (joint) effect of the lags of inflation on TFP-growth is robust to the inclusion of
additional lags of the endogenous variables (1-4) at both frequencies. The additional tables are available from
the authors upon request.
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works independently from the adjustment of the private investment share and GDP-growth.
In addition, we find that inflation Granger causes private investment at neither frequency. We
infer that, in our sample, the transmission channel of inflation does not rest on private factor
accumulation. This result underpins our hypothesis that inflation affects the composition rather
than the overall level of private investment.16 Finally, inspection of reverse causality from TFP-
growth towards inflation shows that TFP-growth reduces inflation in the subsequent period at
a yearly (significant at a 5% level), but not at quarterly frequency.
These results confirm a negative relation between inflation and TFP-growth at business
cycle frequencies. The specific mechanism we put forward in this paper implies that an increase
in inflation reduces corporate liquidity holdings which are used as insurance against the risk
associated with physical investment relying on advanced technologies. The reduced liquidity
holdings, in turn, induce a shift in the composition of investment and hence aggregate changes
in TFP. A (non-structural) representation of this mechanism is given by the following system
of equations:
∆Tt = αT + βT Ct +X ′iγT + Tt (1a)
Ct = α
C + βCDt +X
′
iγ
C + Ct (1b)
Dt = α
D + βDpit +X
′
iγ
D + Dt , (1c)
where ∆T is TFP-growth, C is investment composition, D are aggregate corporate liquidity
holdings, pi is inflation and X is a vector of covariates which affect all variables. In the following,
we want to test the macroeconomic mechanism underlying system (1). Therefore, we exploit
firm-level US data from the Compustat database and average across firms to obtain the relevant
aggregate measures. Following Opler et al. (1999), we approximate investment composition
by corporate investments in R&D and corporate liquidity holdings by the amount of cash and
marketable securities, both relative to total assets. Moreover, we include average operating
income, total assets and the amount of long term debt as additional control variables. To
deal with an endogeneity problem of average R&D ratios and corporate liquidity holdings
with respect to TFP-growth in the sense of E(Ct | Tt ) 6= 0, E(Dt | Ct ) 6= 0, we apply an
instrumental variable approach. Specifically, in view of potential contemporaneous feedback
effects from TFP-growth to inflation, we assume E(pit−1 | Tt ) = 0 and employ lagged inflation
as an instrument. In fact, the pattern of estimated coefficients from the unrestricted VAR
suggests that the first lag of inflation is exogenous to TFP-growth since it Granger causes
TFP-growth, while the lagged dependent variable of TFP-growth itself is not significant. If,
in addition, the lag of inflation is correlated with average R&D ratios and corporate liquidity
holdings (which we illustrate below), it is a valid instrument for these endogenous measures
in equations (1a) and (1b). Furthermore, we consider the nominal interest rate (R˜) as an
alternative measure of nominal fluctuations and apply its first lag as an additional instrument
for the endogenous measures in these equations.17 This allows us to test for the validity of our
instruments by employing a Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. Consequently, we use
the first lags of inflation and the nominal interest rate as exogenous instrumental variables to
16Similarly, Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Aghion et al. (2006) call the effect of macroeconomic uncertainty
on aggregate investment into question.
17The nominal interest rate is represented by the yield on corporate bonds (Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate
Bond Yield) because the latter is the closest proxy for firms’ cost of external finance.
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estimate via the general method of moments (GMM) the causal effect of investment composition
and average corporate liquidity holdings on TFP-growth. The Hansen test statistic indicates
a well-specified econometric model in all reported estimations; furthermore, we always include
a lagged dependent variable and incorporate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in all
estimations. Summing up, we separately estimate the equations:
∆Tt = αTC + βTCCt +X
′
iγ
T
C + 
T
C,t (2a)
∆Tt = αTD + βTDDt +X
′
iγ
T
D + 
T
D,t, (2b)
whereby we treat C and D as endogenous and model them respectively as:
Ct = α
C
C + β
C
1 pit−1 + β
C
2 R˜t−1 +X
′
iγ
C
C + 
C
C,t (3a)
Dt = α
D
D + β
D
1 pit−1 + β
D
2 R˜t−1 +X
′
iγ
D
D + 
D
D,t (3b)
The results for US yearly data are reported in Table 2. Columns one to four are concerned with
equations (2a) and (3a). The first column displays a positive correlation between the average
R&D investment ratio and TFP-growth. The corresponding coefficient is significant on a 1%
level. This positive correlation is independent of changes in average firm size, average operat-
ing income across firms, average value of corporate long-term debt and aggregate private and
government investment shares. Moreover, the Arellano-Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation
indicates the absence of first and second order serial correlation in the error terms. In the next
two columns, we instrument advanced (R&D) investments by the first lags of inflation and the
nominal interest rate, whereby column two does not employ the set of exogenous controls. In
both cases, the results reveal a positive causal effect of advanced investment on TFP-growth
which is significant on a 1% level. In addition, the Hansen test shows that the first lags of
inflation and the nominal interest rate are valid instruments. Finally, we display the (modified)
first stage regression in column four, whereby we excluded the nominal interest rate.18 The first
stage regression indicates a negative impact of the first lag of inflation on advanced investments.
The corresponding coefficient is significant on a 1% level. In columns five to eight, we repeat the
same exercise for equations (2b) and (3b), now instrumenting for our second endogenous trans-
mission variable. First, we detect a positive significant contemporaneous correlation between
the average corporate liquidity holdings and TFP-growth. The subsequent IV-estimations re-
veal that causation is indeed running from average corporate liquidity holdings to TFP-growth.
The Hansen test indicates the validity of our instruments in both specifications. Finally, the
(modified) first stage regression reports a strong negative impact of lagged inflation on average
corporate liquidity holdings which is significant on a 1% level. Summing up, on the basis of
annual US time series we find support for our model hypothesis which proposes that inflation
and nominal interest rates reduce TFP-growth in the short-run by affecting average corporate
liquidity holdings and the composition of firm-level physical investment portfolios.
Table 3 is concerned with the same questions, but for quarterly frequency. Due to the
higher frequency, we now use the first two lags of inflation and the nominal interest rate as
instrumental variables. We find a positive correlation between quarterly average R&D ratios
and TFP-growth; as evidenced by columns two and three, applying an IV-approach reveals
18For unfiltered data, the correlation coefficient between CPI inflation and the nominal interest rate (Moody’s
Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield) is 0.42 (0.55) at yearly (quarterly) frequency.
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that causation is running from advanced (R&D) investments to TFP-growth. The first lag of
inflation features a negative correlation with the average R&D ratio, which is significant on a
1% level. The results for firms’ average quarterly liquidity holdings are less clear-cut. We do
not detect a significant positive correlation between this endogenous measure and TFP-growth
at a quarterly frequency. Accordingly, at quarterly frequency the IV-approach does not confirm
a significant impact of average corporate liquidity on TFP-growth even though the former is
negatively influenced by lagged inflation. Overall, the results based on quarterly data appear
less robust than the previous ones, which suggests that firms’ adjustment in terms of their
liquidity holdings or investment portfolios to changes in the level of inflation might not be swift
enough to record at quarterly frequency.
To sum up, for US data we find a robust negative empirical relation between inflation and
TFP-growth which is independent of changes in the private investment share or GDP-growth.
A Granger causality test indicates that causality is running from inflation to TFP-growth.
These two empirical observations challenge the presumption of conventional monetary business
cycle theories which take the aggregate productivity process as exogenous or stipulate that real
effects of inflation are transmitted via changes in the aggregate quantity of investments. The
results of the IV-approach suggest that, on average, the aggregate negative effect of inflation
on TFP is due to firm-level variations in liquidity holdings and investment composition.
4 The model
In view of above empirical findings, we now propose a one-sector model of a monetary economy
as a tractable structure formalizing the economic intuition underlying our proposed transmission
mechanism. As hinted in the Introduction, the model’s key ingredients are (i) limited asset
market participation, (ii) endogenous technology choice, and (iii) incomplete financial markets.
The economy is populated by two sets of agents, households and entrepreneurs, each of unit
mass. The production sector is characterized by two distinct intermediate input goods, labelled
”basic” and ”advanced” corresponding to the characteristics of the two constant-returns-to-scale
technologies which are used to produce them,19 and by a simple aggregation technology that
combines the two intermediate goods to the final market good. Each entrepreneur runs an
individual firm producing both intermediate input goods, though in distinct projects utilizing
the respective technology. The final market good is produced by anonymous firms in a perfectly
competitive market environment. In addition, there is a market for financial intermediation
which is also assumed to be perfectly competitive. Finally, there is a government (”monetary
authority”) which implements macroeconomic policies. These policies, together with a set of
exogenous shocks, expose the economy to aggregate uncertainty.
The timing structure underlying our model is as follows. Time is discrete, and within each
period t, there are three points in time: one at the beginning of the period, denoted t−, one
at an interim stage when the vector st of aggregate shocks materializes and information about
them is revealed, and finally one at the end of the period, denoted t+. The aggregate shocks in
our model are productivity shocks At, Vt to the two intermediate technologies as well as a shock
Jt to government policy (to be specified later); hence, we have st = {At,Vt,Jt}. Apart from
19As a general rule, variables pertaining to the basic input good are indicated by the variable/superscript k,
while z is the relevant indicator for the advanced input good.
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these aggregate shocks, there are purely idiosyncratic liquidity shocks ξit to the single advanced
technology project run by an individual entrepreneur. We now turn to a detailed description
of the environment in which the economy’s agents interact and define their decision problems.
The exposition of the solution to the agents’ problems as well as of the competitive equilibrium
are relegated to the Appendix A; the most important equilibrium implications are discussed in
in Section 4.6.
4.1 Households
Households enter a given period t with claims to two distinct capital stocks (kt, zt) accumulated
from the past together with a nominal wealth position Mt. At time t
−, households divide
their nominal wealth into resources Qt disposable for consumption later in the period and
deposits Mt − Qt with a financial intermediary which earn a net interest rate (R˜t − 1).20
After aggregate shocks have materialized, households rent out their technology-specific physical
capital to the entrepreneurs who run the projects producing the basic and advanced input good,
respectively. Similarly, they supply labor hk,Ht to basic and h
z,H
t to advanced projects, resulting
in an aggregate labor supply of hHt = h
k,H
t + h
z,H
t , whereby households are indifferent as to
where their labor is employed.21 As an equilibrium consequence, households will receive the
same nominal wage W k,Ht = W
z,H
t = W
H
t in both projects. At time t
+, households receive
the returns from labor and capital and make consumption and investment decisions. However,
there is a cash constraint on the goods market with the consequence that a household’s current
expenditure for consumption cHt and physical investment xt must be covered by the resources
Qt earmarked for consumption plus a fraction θ of its current wage earnings. The household
has preferences over sequences of consumption and labor supply; hence, the household problem
is to maximize lifetime utility:
E0−
∞∑
t=0
βtu(cHt , h
H
t ) (4a)
subject to the cash constraint:
Qt + θW
H
t h
H
t ≥ Pt[cHt + xt], (4b)
an equation describing the evolution of nominal assets:
Mt+1 = Qt + θW
H
t h
H
t − Pt[cHt + xt] + R˜t[Mt −Qt + Jt]
+ Rkt kt +R
z
t zt + (1− θ)WHt hHt +Υt, (4c)
where Jt are cash injections into the financial market on behalf of the government and Υt are
nominal resources redistributed in a lump sum fashion among the consumers at the end of the
period; moreover, there is a law of motion for aggregate capital Kt = kt + zt, which accounts
for depreciation and technology-specific adjustment costs Φ(·):
xt = (kt+1 + zt+1)− (1− δ)(kt + zt) + Φ(kt, kt+1) + Φ(zt, zt+1) (4d)
20This timing convention is standard in monetary models which feature a limited participation assumption
on the household side; compare e.g. Lucas (1990).
21Where necessary, variables pertaining to the household sector will be denoted with a superscriptH; similarly,
the superscript E is used to indicate variables pertaining to entrepreneurs.
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4.2 Entrepreneurs
Apart from households, there is a unit mass of risk neutral entrepreneurs, each one capable
of running a single firm which produces the two distinct intermediary input goods. Any such
entrepreneurial firm has access to a neoclassical production plan utilizing the basic technology
as well as to a single advanced technology project. At the beginning of each period, a mass
(1−η) of new-born entrepreneurs enters the economy without any initial wealth and replaces an
equal measure of retiring entrepreneurs. The remaining measure η of incumbent entrepreneurs
stays active. An individual entrepreneur arrives in period t with an amount Ait of nominal
wealth. Then, if she receives a random exit signal, she waits until the end of the period to
simply consume her accumulated wealth such that Ait = Ptc
E,i
t . In contrast, new entrants and
entrepreneurs who have not received the exit signal have no consumption motive; rather, each
active entrepreneur inelastically supplies her (unit) labor endowment hEt = h
k,E
t +h
z,E
t = 1 and
thus augments her nominal wealth Ait by her current wage earnings W
E
t . As for households,
only a fraction θ of these wage earnings is immediately disposable such that an individual
entrepreneur’s effective wealth position is Eit = A
i
t + θW
E
t ; E
i
t constitutes the entrepreneur’s
necessary private equity stake when she applies for funding of her advanced project with a
financial intermediary.
4.2.1 Intermediate input goods
Each of the two intermediate input goods is produced in an environment of perfect competition.
Both input goods require capital as well as labor for production, but they are characterized
by different technologies. On the one hand, there is a safe, but return-dominated (”basic”)
technology; the other (”advanced”) technology yields a higher potential return, but is subject
to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. The scope for insuring an individual advanced project against
this idiosyncratic liquidity risk is endogenously determined via a (constrained-efficient) finan-
cial contract. The need for this insurance arises as a consequence of an entrepreneurial moral
hazard problem which prevents the efficient refinancing of projects and calls for the commit-
ment of liquidity at the ex ante, rather than the ex post stage. A key distinction between the
two technologies is the relevance of entrepreneurial moral hazard for the successful completion
of production processes: In particular, we assume the basic technology to be free from the
moral hazard problem such that the standard theory of corporate finance applies here; con-
versely, production by means of the advanced technology is subject to ex post entrepreneurial
moral hazard. Another friction that is relevant for both tehnologies is an advance payment
requirement, which necessitates borrowing working capital in order to pay wages; specifically,
the parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] represents the fraction of the wage bill to be financed in advance.
Basic technology: Employment of labor and capital inputs (lkt , kt) for the basic technology
is chosen such as to maximize time t+ profits, whereby the vector of prices (P kt ,W
k
t , R
k
t , R˜t) is
taken as given. The basic technology producing intermediate goods is assumed to be homoge-
nous of degree one and features labor augmenting technological progress at the exogenous rate
γ. For simplicity, we employ the Cobb-Douglas form:
ϕ(kt, l
k
t ) = (kt)
αk ((1 + γ)tlkt )1−αk
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Similarly, a Cobb-Douglas aggregator converts household and entrepreneurial labor inputs into
their effective composite, and agent-specific wages aggregate to a composite wage rate:
lkt =
(hk,Ht )
Ω(hk,Et )
(1−Ω)
(Ω)Ω(1− Ω)(1−Ω) and W
k
t = (W
k,H
t )
Ω(W k,Et )
(1−Ω)
Hence, the problem when employing the basic technology is:
max
{kt,lkt }
Πkt = P
k
t
(Atϕ(kt, lkt ))−W kt lkt −Rkt kt−1 − θ(R˜t − 1)W kt lkt
= P kt y
k
t − C(W kt , Rkt , R˜t; ykt ). (5)
Advanced technology: Apart from controlling the basic production plan, each entrepreneur
also runs a single advanced technology project. For any such project, the production plan is
complicated by the risk that it is hit by a liquidity shock22 which may trigger project termi-
nation before it yields any return. We assume that liquidity risk ξ˜it is proportional to planned
revenue P zt y˜
z
t and that the normalized liquidity shock ξ
i
t ≡ ξ˜
i
t
P zt y˜
z
t
is distributed according to
a continuous distribution function G(ξit) with associated (strictly positive) density g(ξ
i
t). As
for the basic intermediate goods, there is a Cobb-Douglas aggregation of the respective labor
inputs by households and entrepreneurs, and the technology is given by a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function under constant returns to scale which allows for exogenous labor augmenting
technological progress:
f(zt, l
z
t ) = (zt)
αz ((1 + γ)tlzt )1−αz
An individual entrepreneur brings the amount Eit as private equity into her intermediary firm.
The advanced production plan and the hedge against liquidity shocks are then determined as
part of a constrained-efficient contract between the entrepreneur and the financial intermediary.
4.3 Financial intermediation
The financial intermediary (or equivalently, a perfectly competitive financial sector) receives
the time t− financial deposits Mt−Qt from the households as well as lump sum cash injections
Jt from the monetary authority. These funds are supplied to the loans market at a gross
nominal interest rate R˜t. At the loans market, this supply meets the demand for financial
assets which comes from two sources: First, entrepreneurial firms demand short term credit in
order to meet the advance financing requirement for a fraction θ of their respective wage bills.
Second, entrepreneurs demand liquidity Dt to be held as a buffer stock insuring their respective
advanced technology projects. Hence, financial market clearing requires:
Mt −Qt + Jt = θWtLt +Dt, (6)
where Wt and Lt are the aggregate wage rate and labor input across households and en-
trepreneurs and across the two intermediary technologies. Above condition simply stipulates
22The liquidity shock admits a variety of interpretations. It can be thought of as a simple cost overrun, as a
shortfall of revenue at an interim stage which could have been used as an internal source of refinancing or as
adverse information relating to the project’s end-of-period profitability.
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that the equilibrium interest rate R˜t balances the supply of loans with the corporate demand
for funds due to its advance financing requirement and its need for precautionary liquidity.
The financial intermediary operates after aggregate uncertainty is resolved. While lending to
projects employing the basic technology proceeds in a frictionless market, lending to advanced
technology projects is complicated by an entrepreneurial moral hazard problem which is dealt
with by a financial contract. Two key implications of this contracting scheme are that firm
bankruptcy is an equilibrium phenomenon and that the intermediary must commit funds to
individual advanced technology projects before these projects’ idiosyncratic liquidity needs are
known. Therefore, it is important to recognize that the financial intermediary is able to pool
idiosyncratic risks across individual projects because, as a consequence, it is sufficient for the fi-
nancial intermediary to break even on an individual credit relationship in expectation.23 At the
end of the period, the intermediary receives the returns on its lending and financial investment
activity and pays the amount R˜t[Mt −Qt + Jt] to the households in return for their deposits.
We next turn to a detailed description of the specific contracting problem in our model.
Financial contracting: Following Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998), the sequencing of events
underlying an individual advanced project’s within-period24 contracting problem can be de-
composed into three stages. At stage one, after aggregate uncertainty with respect to st =
{At,Vt,Jt} is unveiled, the entrepreneur running an individual advanced project and holding
an equity position Et in it contracts with the financial intermediary to pin down its production
plan and refinancing provisions. In particular, the refinancing provisions determine the degree
of insurance against idiosyncratic liquidity risk.25 Given st, a contract between the financial
intermediary (outside investor) and the entrepreneur holding equity Et prescribes (i) the scale
of production as determined by factor employment (zt, l
z
t ), (ii) a state contingent continuation
rule Γt(ξt), and (iii) a state contingent transfer τt(ξt) from the entrepreneur to the investor.
Hence, a generic contract takes the form Ct = {zt, lzt ,Γt(ξt), τt(ξt)}. A constraint on the contract
is that it is written under limited liability, i.e. in case of project termination factors must be
remunerated by the outside investor. At a subsequent interim stage (stage two) after the factor
employment decisions have been made, the project is hit by an idiosyncratic liquidity shock
ξt. If the shock is met by appropriate refinancing, the project can continue; otherwise it is
liquidated. We assume that the liquidity shock is verifiable, but it is shown in Holmstro¨m and
Tirole (1998) that nothing changes if only the entrepreneur observes the shock as long as she
23Moreover, the intermediary’s risk pooling capability also facilitates insurance of households’ claims against
individual advanced projects; the financial intermediary can therefore be thought of not only as matching supply
of and demand for short-term credit, but also as a mutual fund pooling all household claims against advanced
projects. The consequence is that, from an individual household’s perspective, idiosyncratic risk ξit is hedged,
while aggregate risk from st = {At,Vt,Jt} remains relevant.
24Although the advanced production plan is conditional on the predetermined entrepreneurial equity position
Eit , the factor demand problem itself is not dynamic because entrepreneurial asset accumulation proceeds
mechanically and there is no intertemporal incentive provision. Moreover, since the financial contract turns
out to be linear in Eit , the distribution of equity across entrepreneurs does not matter and exact aggregation is
possible. From now on, we will therefore drop the superscript i.
25It is important to realize that the financial contract is negotiated after fresh cash Jt has been injected into
the economy. Consequently, our concept of corporate liquidity is real in the sense that there is no nominal
rigidity which, upon an increase in the price level, would discount the effective insurance capacity of any given
nominal amount of liquid assets; what is affected by nominal fluctuations, though, is its relative price, the
liquidity premium (R˜t − 1).
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does not benefit from diverting resources. After the continuation decision, there is scope for
moral hazard on the part of the entrepreneur in that she can exert effort to affect the distribu-
tion of production outcomes. Specifically, we make the extreme assumption that, conditional
on continuation, exerting effort guarantees a gross return of P zt y˜
z
t = P
z
t Vtf(zt, lzt ) to production
activity, while shirking leads to zero output, but generates a private (non-monetary) benefit Bt.
We assume that the private benefit is proportional to project revenue conditional on survival;
in particular, we have: Bt = bP
z
t Vtf(zt, lzt ) = bP zt y˜zt with 0 < b < 1.26 Finally, at stage three,
the revenue from production accrues and payoffs are realized according to the rules stipulated
in the financial contract. The financial intermediary engages in a continuum of contracts with
all entrepreneurs operating the advanced technology; since liquidity risk is idiosyncratic, the
intermediary is therefore able to pool the risk inherent in the investments across individual
projects. As an implication, we can completely abstract from the effects of idiosyncratic un-
certainty on the investor’s evaluation of payoffs. Similarly, the entrepreneur who is exposed to
her uninsured private equity risk is risk neutral and cares only about expected profits as long
as she is active.
Hypothetically abstracting from both the entrepreneurial incentive constraint and the cost
of obtaining liquidity at the interim stage, it is easy to see that there exists a unique cutoff value
corresponding to a continuation policy which prescribes project continuation if and only if the
liquidity shock is such that ξt ≤ 1. The reason is that the stage one investment is sunk; hence,
at the interim stage, it is optimal to refinance up to the full value of what can be generated
in terms of revenue at the final stage. However, the need to take into account the incentive
constraint and the costs of liquidity provision implies that the continuation policy will take the
form:
Γt(ξt) =
{
1, if ξt ≤ ξˆt
0, if ξt > ξˆt
for some cutoff value ξˆt < 1. Hence, Γt(ξt) is a simple indicator function with Γt(ξt) = 1 in case
of continuation and Γt(ξt) = 0 in case of termination.
A constrained-efficient contract Ct = {zt, lzt ,Γt(ξt), τt(ξt)} with (zt, lzt ) determining the scale
of production, and Γt(ξt) and τt(ξt) pinning down the state contingent policies for project
continuation and transfers per unit of production costs C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
, respectively, then
solves the following second best program of maximizing the entrepreneur’s net return:
max
Ct
∫ {
Γt(ξt)P
z
t y˜
z
t − τt(ξt)C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)}
dG(ξt)− Et (7a)
subject to a participation constraint for the investor that requires him to break even in expec-
tation:∫ {
τt(ξt)C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
− Γt(ξt)ξtR˜tP zt y˜zt
}
dG(ξt) ≥ C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
− Et (7b)
and a state-by-state incentive compatibility constraint for the entrepreneur:
Γt(ξt)P
z
t y˜
z
t − τt(ξt)C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
≥ Γt(ξt)bP zt y˜zt ∀ ξt, (7c)
26Note, however, that the specific value of b > 0 will not matter as long as the constrained-efficient contract
to be derived in Appendix A.3 delivers an interior solution.
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where y˜zt = Vt (zt)α
z
((1 + γ)tlzt )
1−αz
is the project’s output conditional on survival and:
C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
= MCzt
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t
)
y˜zt =
1
Vt
(
Rt
αz
)αz (
[1 + θ(R˜t − 1)]W zt
(1− αz)
)(1−αz)
y˜zt
= [1 + θ(R˜t − 1)]W zt lzt +Rzt zt (8)
are the associated total costs which accrue when a output level of y˜zt is targeted in case of
survival; by constant returns to scale, the marginal cost MCzt (·) of increasing planned output
y˜zt is constant. Note how the specification of this problem, by means of the participation
constraint (7b), incorporates the requirement that the investor who bears the risk of project
failure be willing to finance the project, whereby the outside investor commits both the factor
remuneration and the interim resources needed to meet the liquidity shock. Appendix A.3
shows that the solution to program (7) in terms of the optimal cutoff ξˆ∗t is determined via the
following first order condition: ∫ ξˆ∗t
0
G(ξt)dξt =
MCzt (·)
P zt
1
R˜t
(9)
This condition illustrates that the cost of providing liquidity at the interim stage, which has to
be obtained in the financial market at the financial rate R˜t, as well as the gap between prices
and marginal costs
P zt
MCzt (·) play a key role in shaping the optimal contract.
Implementation and aggregate liquidity demand: The key element of the solution to
program (7) is the second best cutoff value ξˆ∗t up to which refinancing needs will be covered such
that production can proceed. In order to hedge against such liquidity shocks, it is necessary that
outside investors commit funds at the initial contracting stage (stage one). The reason is that,
by issuing corporate claims at the interim stage (stage two), it is not possible to raise enough
funds because the entrepreneurial commitment problem limits the maximum return pledgeable
to outside investors at ξˆ0t =
(1−b)
R˜t
< ξˆ∗t . It is then a natural question to ask how the second best
policy can actually be implemented at the initial contracting stage; moreover, in view of our
modelling hypothesis that an economy’s physical investment portfolio is affected by the degree
to which risky production activities can be insured by means of corporate liquidity holdings,
there arises the related question of whether there is a second best policy that features firms
(rather than the intermediary) holding liquidity. These questions are dealt with in Appendix
A.4. Here, suffice it to stress (i) that second best contracting can indeed be implemented via
liquidity holdings at the firm level and (ii) that under financial intermediation, which efficiently
economizes on the use of scarce liquidity by pooling liquidity risk across projects, the aggregate
demand for liquidity is:
Dt =
[∫ ξˆ∗t
0
ξtg(ξt)dξt
]
P zt y˜
z
t (10)
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4.4 Market good
The market good is simply aggregated over the two technology-specific intermediate input goods
supplied by the entrepreneurs:
yt =
(
ζ
1
ρykt
ρ−1
ρ + (1− ζ) 1ρyzt
ρ−1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
, (11)
where yt is the final output good and y
z
t and y
k
t are the two distinct intermediate input goods.
The two parameters 0 < ζ < 1 and ρ > 0 determine the weight of each intermediate good in
producing the aggregate market good and the elasticity of substitution of the two intermediates.
Productive efficiency pins down the minimum cost combination of the final good firms’ demands
for intermediate input goods to be functions of the relative prices for the relevant intermediate
input P jt , j = k, z and for the final output Pt:
ykt = ζ
(
P kt
Pt
)−ρ
yt and y
z
t = (1− ζ)
(
P zt
Pt
)−ρ
yt (12)
We assume perfect competition on the final goods market; therefore, the aggregate price level
is determined by the marginal input cost, i.e. the intermediate good prices, which are constant
from the final good firm’s perspective. Consequently, zero profits imply:
Pt =
(
ζP kt
1−ρ
+ (1− ζ)P zt 1−ρ
) 1
1−ρ
(13)
For future reference, we also define the respective aggregates of the two factors of production,
capital Kt = kt + zt and labor Lt = l
k
t + l
z
t , as well as the elasticities of aggregate output with
respect to the intermediate input levels:
ωyyk,t ≡
dyt/yt
dykt /y
k
t
= ζ
1
ρ
(
ykt
yt
) ρ−1
ρ
and ωyyz,t ≡
dyt/yt
dyzt /y
z
t
= (1− ζ) 1ρ
(
yzt
yt
) ρ−1
ρ
(14)
4.5 Government policy
In order to close the model, a specification for government policy is needed. The focus of our
analysis is not a normative one; therefore, to keep things simple, we will consider an exogenous
process for monetary policy which consists of periodic injections Jt of money in the financial
market. Jt is implicitly defined as Jt = (emgt − 1) (Mt + At), where mgt is the gross rate of
money growth. Hence, the aggregate of nominal wealth held by households and entrepreneurs
is updated according to:
(Mt+1 + At+1) = e
mgt (Mt + At)
The gross rate of money growth mgt is assumed to evolve according to an autoregressive mean-
reverting process:
mgt = ρjmgt−1 + (1− ρj)mg∗ + j,t, j ∼ N (0, σ2j ),
where mg∗ is the steady state level of money growth, which together with the economy’s
exogenous (balanced) growth rate γ determines the rate of inflation prevailing in steady state.
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4.6 Equilibrium implications
The solution to the agents’ optimization problems, the details on the implementation of financial
contracting subject to entrepreneurial moral hazard as well as the definition of a competitive
equilibrium are all contained in Appendix A. In the following, we put on record a set of
important equilibrium implications which are informative with respect to the effects of monetary
fluctuations on corporate liquidity demand and the composition of firms’ physical investment.
They are derived on the basis of the financial contracting scheme outlined in Section 4.3, which
pins down the optimal amount of liquidity provision ξˆ∗t , and will be the object of our empirical
analysis below.
• H1: Ceteris paribus,27 an increase in R˜t leads to a lower cutoff ξˆ∗t :
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
= −
∫ ξˆ∗t
0
G(ξt)dξt
R˜tG(ξˆ∗t )
< 0 (15)
Thus, quite intuitively, higher nominal interest rates R˜t imply less hedging against idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks because the financial intermediary’s participation constraint gets tighter in line
with the increased costs of providing liquidity. In order to examine the effects of other changes in
the economic environment on firms’ liquidity demand, we establish two auxiliary results. First,
increased volatility of the liquidity shock distribution G(·) in the sense of a mean-preserving
spread implies a lower cutoff value ξˆ∗t ; formally
dξˆ∗t
dσξ
< 0.28 The intuition behind this result is
that increased risk makes the option to terminate any given advanced project more valuable.
The empirical prediction therefore is that firms operating in a more volatile environment are
insured less comprehensively. Second, situations where production by means of the advanced
technology is more profitable, i.e. situations characterized by higher markups of prices over
marginal costs
P zt
MCzt (·) are predicted to feature a lower ξˆ
∗
t ; formally
dξˆ∗t
d(P zt /MC
z
t )
< 0.29 The reason
for the poorer insurance of more profitable projects is the contracting trade-off between ex ante
and ex post rationing underlying the efficient choice of ξˆ∗t : While a more generous provision
with liquidity has the advantage of withstanding larger shocks, the higher associated costs
necessarily imply a lower stage one investment volume. Thus, for highly profitable projects,
both contracting parties prefer to cut ξˆ∗t in order to expand the project size. Based on these
results, we can derive two additional hypotheses relating to the sensitivity of specific firms to
fluctuations in the nominal interest rate.
• H2: Increased production risk (in the form of a mean-preserving spread of the distribution
G(·)) accentuates the negative effect of R˜t on the cutoff ξˆ∗t :
d
dσξ
(
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
)
=
dξˆ∗t
dσξ
d
dξˆ∗t
(
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
)
< 0, (16)
27The claimed result obtains if, to a first approximation, P
z
t
MCzt (·) remains constant. The result then follows
from total differentiation of condition (9). That is, the results derived in the following are valid from a partial
equilibrium perspective; taking into account general equilibrium effects does not change the qualitative (sign)
properties of the relevant derivatives.
28Variations in the standard deviation σξ need to be restricted to mean-preserving spreads. The result then
obtains by partial integration; compare Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), chapter 6.
29This follows from total differentiation of condition (9), for given R˜t.
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where the inequality follows from the fact that ξˆ∗t is decreasing in the volatility of the
shock distribution and differentiation of expression (15) with respect to ξˆ∗t .
• H3: Increased profitability accentuates the negative effect of R˜t on the cutoff ξˆ∗t :
d
d(P zt /MC
z
t )
(
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
)
=
dξˆ∗t
d(P zt /MC
z
t )
d
dξˆ∗t
(
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
)
< 0, (17)
where the inequality follows from the fact that ξˆ∗t is decreasing in the price-to-marginal-
cost ratio and differentiation of expression (15) with respect to ξˆ∗t .
Moreover, starting from the supposition that the economy’s productive activity is organized
based on a set of distinct technologies available to a continuum of entrepreneurial firms, we can
infer a measure Tt of aggregate productivity. The argument put forward within the framework of
our model is that Tt is not simply determined as an exogenous residual process, but also affected
by endogenous shifts in the composition of economic activity. In detail, as shown in Appendix
B, we derive our aggregate measure of TFP such that changes in Tt can be decomposed as
follows:
T̂t = ωyyk,tÂt + ωyyz,t
(
V̂t + ωGξˆ∗,t
̂ˆ
ξ∗t
)
, (18)
where x̂ ≡ dx
x
and where ωG
ξˆ∗
= g(ξˆ
∗)ξˆ∗
G(ξˆ∗)
denotes the elasticity of the survival probability with
respect to the cutoff value for liquidity shocks ξˆ∗. Expression (18) illustrates how changes in
Tt can be expressed as a weighted sum of changes in the technology-specific productivity levels
At and Vt. The endogenous weights attached to Ât and V̂t are given by the elasticity terms
ωyyk,t and ω
y
yz,t defined in (14), which underpins the importance of the sectoral composition of
production activities; moreover, since the elasticity terms are formulated in terms of realized
intermediate output levels, the effect of V̂t is amended by the term ωGξˆ∗,t
̂ˆ
ξ∗t which reflects how the
level of realized advanced sector output yzt (as opposed to y˜
z
t , the relevant quantity conditional
on survival) responds to changes in the degree of insurance against liquidity risk provided to
advanced projects. Thus, besides the exogenous processes At and Vt, there are two endogenous
sources of fluctuations in measured TFP: First, shifts in the allocation of physical investments
(kt, zt) - an investment composition effect; and second, for a given composition of aggregate
investment, changes in the effectiveness of converting hired factor inputs (zt, l
z
t ) into realized
output yzt - an insurance effect in response to changes in the liquidity premium. Now, building
on equations (15) and (18), the model’s key implication with respect to aggregate fluctuations
is obtained.
• H4: For given realizations of At and Vt, an increase in R˜t leads to a drop in TFP:
dTt
dR˜t
= ωyyz,tω
G
ξˆ∗
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
< 0, (19)
where the inequality follows from ωyyz,t, ω
G
ξˆ∗
> 0 and (15).
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Finally, differentiation of equation (19) facilitates a prediction concerning the differential impact
of nominal fluctuations across economies characterized by different production structures:
• H5: Higher exposure to the advanced technology, as measured by a higher ωyyz,t, implies
a higher responsiveness of TFP to movements in R˜t:
d
dωyyz,t
(
dTt
dR˜t
)
= ωG
ξˆ∗
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
< 0, (20)
which follows from ωG
ξˆ∗
> 0 and (15).
5 Quantitative model analysis
The model is calibrated to US time series at quarterly frequency, whereby we employ macroeco-
nomic aggregates and amend them by industry-level data in order to calibrate the parameters
that pin down the relative employment of ”basic” versus ”advanced” technologies. A descrip-
tion of the data as well as the details of our calibration exercise such as the specification of
functional forms are contained in Appendix C. The calibrated benchmark set of parameters is
summarized in Table 4. In order to assess the quantitative role of nominal shocks for aggregate
fluctuations and in particular for the endogenous evolution of TFP, we now analyze the statis-
tical properties of the model economy, employing the routines proposed by Sims (2001). As far
as the monetary transmission mechanism is concerned, the effects of an unanticipated monetary
expansion are twofold: First, there is a liquidity effect, recording as a drop in nominal interest
rates on impact, and second, there is an inflationary effect which may take time to materialize.
The induced dynamic pattern of nominal interest rates is key in shaping firms’ investment with
respect to its overall amount, but also with respect to its composition. Importantly, the compo-
sitional effects are associated with changes in aggregate productivity. Against this background,
the main purpose of the following analysis is to examine within the framework of our model
economy whether monetary shocks can indeed account for a sizeable fraction of fluctuations
in TFP.30 We approach this question based on a series of numerical experiments. First, we
simulate the model for our benchmark calibration and confront the generated moments with
empirical US business cycle statistics. Second, we consider the same model economy, but shut
down money shocks as a source of nominal fluctuations; this exercise allows us to decompose
the volatility of key macroeconomic aggregates - particularly of TFP - into the fractions that
are attributable to money and technology shocks, respectively. Finally, we are interested in the
steady state effects of increased nominal distortions, an issue that we approach by comparing
the equilibrium allocations of alternative economies which are indexed by different rates of in-
flation along their balanced growth paths.
Empirical and simulated business cycle statistics: Table 5 documents empirical and
simulated business cycle statistics. Of particular interest are standard deviations as well as
contemporaneous correlations of several macroeconomic aggregates with real GDP. We point
out that, empirically, aggregate productivity is procyclical with respect to real GDP, whereas
both the level and the growth rate of TFP are negatively correlated with the rate of inflation (in
30In contrast, it is not our principal objective to replicate salient features of the US monetary business cycle.
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terms of both the GDP deflator and CPI inflation) and different nominal interest rate measures,
the own rate on M2 and the yield on corporate bonds.31 Our benchmark model economy is
characterized by a steady state quarterly rate of inflation of 1.31% and a remaining parametriza-
tion as summarized in Table 4. The linearized model is simulated, and the columns labelled
”benchmark economy” in Table 5 report standard deviations as well as cross-correlations with
aggregate output; for TFP, we also present cross-correlations with nominal interest rates and
inflation. A comparison with the empirical statistics reveals that the model-generated standard
deviations are consistent with the empirical pattern as far as relative magnitudes are concerned,
but that the implied volatility of output falls short of its empirical counterpart, while the model
statistics for hours worked and aggregate productivity reflect the increased (as compared to the
data) volatility of the monetary variables. Turning to the contemporaneous correlations, we
find that hours and aggregate investment display less procyclicality with aggregate output than
observed in the data and that, counterfactually, a negative comovement of inflation and real
GDP is predicted. On the other hand, the benchmark model generates interest rate correlations
(0.07) which strike a balance with respect to the diverging sign pattern of the two analyzed
nominal interest rate measures’ correlations (0.24 and −0.17). Notably, also the comovement
of TFP with real GDP is accurately replicated at 0.55 (versus 0.58 in the data). Turning to
the correlations with nominal interest rates, the key statistic for our purpose is the negative
contemporaneous correlation of TFP which the benchmark model predicts at −0.53 versus,
depending on the interest rate measure, −0.29 or −0.44 in the data. The empirical correlation
of TFP with the two different inflation measures is −0.35 or −0.22, whereas the benchmark
model predicts that inflation and aggregate productivity do hardly comove over the cycle.32
While not reported, we also note that inflation plays the role of a leading indicator for nominal
interest rates; similarly, past money growth is found to be associated with higher nominal in-
terest rates, whereas the contemporaneous correlation is negative due to the liquidity effect of
monetary expansions. Taken together, these facts suggest a systematic effect of monetary pol-
icy on TFP, which is transmitted via fluctuations in the nominal interest rate and - according
to our model - the associated changes in the composition of aggregate investment.
Variance decomposition and key correlations: To further assess the relevance of this
mechanism, we resimulate the model, employing the same parametrization, but shutting down
monetary shocks by setting σj = 0. This exercise facilitates a variance decomposition and is
also informative with respect to the cyclical effects of monetary policy. The relevant statis-
tics are also reported in Table 5 under the heading ”σj = 0”. Importantly, our quantitative
analysis implies that 17.16% = (1.34− 1.11)/1.34 of the fluctuations in aggregate productivity
can be attributed to monetary policy shocks (see column four). Obviously, the quantitative
importance of these shifts in aggregate productivity due to changes in the composition of aggre-
gate investement critically depends on the relative importance of corporate liquidity demand in
31The contemporaneous correlations for the growth rate of TFP, which are not reported in Table 5, are
ρ(∆T , pi (dGDPdef)) = −0.23, ρ(∆T , pi (dCPI)) = −0.22, ρ(∆T , R˜ (M2)) = −0.15 and ρ(∆T , R˜corp) = −0.06.
32The explanation for this somewhat puzzling finding is related to the liquidity effect: Not only does an
expansionary monetary innovation lead to inflation, but it also induces a decrease in nominal interest rates,
thereby increasing aggregate productivity. Our rudimentary benchmark model features an excessively strong
liquidity effect; therefore, the strongly positive comovement between inflation and measured TFP upon impact
nets out the otherwise negative correlation between the two variables.
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overall short-term credit, d
d+θwL
; the latter ratio, in turn, is affected by the advance financing
parameter θ. Specifically, pushing θ from its calibrated benchmark value of 0.25 towards zero
implies that the relative importance of the demand for corporate liquidity to insure advanced
technology investments increases. As a consequence, the sensitivity of aggregate productivity to
fluctuations in the liquidity premium (the bulk of which can be attributed to monetary distur-
bances) is magnified. This is illustrated in column six which, for the alternative economy with
θ = 0.05, reports the fraction of TFP fluctuations to be traced to monetary shocks at 34.88%.
In contrast, the standard deviation of aggregate investment is hardly affected across the alter-
native model economies. The same parameter variations have also important implications for
the correlation pattern between macroeconomic aggregates as illustrated by the columns at the
right end of Table 5. In particular, we point out that the contemporaneous correlation between
TFP and nominal interest rates undergoes a sign switch from −0.53 to 0.15 when shutting down
monetary shocks, while a decrease in θ is seen to intensify the negative comovement between
the two variables. Similar conclusions can also be drawn with respect to the comovement of
inflation and TFP.
Steady states: At a more fundamental level, distortions via increased rates of inflation
and nominal interest rates affect the economy’s real allocation also along a balanced growth
path. Some important indicators for the induced distortions are summarized in Table 6, which
compares steady state allocations across economies indexed by different rates of inflation. Mov-
ing from left to right, it can be seen that increased rates of inflation one-to-one feed into higher
nominal interest rates and thus into a higher liquidity premium for insuring advanced sector
production. The reason for this is that the liquidity premium faced by firms is effectively de-
termined by the households who, due to their CIA constraint, require a higher compensation
for carrying money from one period to the next one. Higher nominal rates then change the
allocation in that (i) the composition of aggregate investment as measured by the ratio z
k
is
shifted towards the basic technology, and (ii) the amount of corporate liquidity used to hedge
advanced sector production decreases. The latter holds true both for the absolute real amount
d = D
P
of corporate liquidity and two relevant measures of liquidity in relation to aggregate
output, d
y
, or the overall demand for short-term credit, d
d+θwL
. The implication is that the
survival probability G(·) of advanced projects successively decreases, which further aggravates
the effect of the distorted composition of aggregate investment; this is evidenced by the ratio
of realized sectoral outputs y
z
yk
which declines by more than the relative allocation of physical
capital. In line with the prediction of H4, the relocation of resources induces a fall in ag-
gregate productivity T ; as hinted above, this drop in TFP is the consequence of two things:
(i) the shift in the composition of aggregate investment towards the basic technology, and (ii)
the decreased insurance against liquidity risk in the advanced sector. Indeed, moving from an
economy which is governed by a Friedman rule (first column) to an economy characterized by a
money growth rate of 10% (column five) leads to a drop in TFP of 2.1%; similarly, moving from
a non-inflationary steady state (column two) to the latter economy goes along with a drop in
TFP of 1.7%. Finally, we mention that also some cyclical aspects of the alternative economies
(indexed by their respective steady state rates of inflation) change as is evidenced by the cor-
relation pattern of nominal interest rates presented in the last line of Table 6. Specifically, the
adverse effects of interest rate shocks on TFP become more pronounced the higher the level of
steady state inflation.
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The results established on the basis of above experiments underpin that our proposed model
may be a useful tool to understand how (inflation-driven) fluctuations in the nominal interest
rate impinge on the cyclical behavior of macroeconomic aggregates and in particular on TFP.
As far as the main phenomenon of interest, the negative causal effect of inflation and nominal
interest rates on aggregate productivity, is concerned, the quantitative model analysis has
demonstrated that not only cyclical fluctuations, but also level effects do play a quantitatively
important role. Thus, at this stage, the model is consistent with the empirical evidence on
the relationship and the inherent causality between macroeconomic aggregates documented in
Section 3. The model has proposed a particular monetary transmission mechanism based on
the qualitative composition of private investment portfolios and the importance of corporate
liquidity holdings to hedge superior investment projects. Since this channel is identified neither
via aggregate data nor the analysis of model-generated moments, we now investigate whether
our specific predictions regarding firm behavior find empirical support in disaggregate data.
6 Empirical analysis of disaggregate data
In this section, we employ disaggregate US data to examine the specific microeconomic mech-
anism underlying our model. We do so in two steps, first exploiting industry-level data and
then firm-level data.
6.1 Sectoral level
Data and methodology: Our model provides us with a set of firm-level predictions (H1 -
H3) as well as aggregate implications (H4 - H5). It is straightforward to extend our one-sector
model to a multi-sector setup, whereby each individual industrial sector is a replica of the
representative production structure described in Section 4. The economywide TFP measures
discussed in the context of H4 and H5 can then readibly interpreted as industry-specific pro-
ductivity measures, and the contracting implications H1 - H3 do apply not only for individual
firms, but also for industrial sectors. Hence, we can empirically test our hypotheses by means
of industry-level data. In particular, as an implication of H2, we are led to hypothesize that
the response in terms of the cutoff ξˆ∗ to movements in the nominal interest rate is stronger for
firms operating in more volatile industries. A positive correlation between the rate of inflation
and nominal interest rates33 and the fact - compare equation (18) - that a lower ξˆ∗ ceteris
paribus leads to lower TFP-growth then together imply that the negative relation between
TFP-growth and inflation is expected to be stronger in more volatile industrial sectors. In ad-
dition, we presume that firms operating in more productive sectors in terms of their historically
realized TFP-growth have had access and are more exposed to superior investment opportuni-
ties and therefore depend more heavily on corporate asset holdings to insure against liquidity
risk. Indeed, for given R˜, equation (8) delivers a link between the technology component V
available to a firm on the one hand and its marginal cost MCz and therefore its profitability
33As already mentioned above, for unfiltered data, the correlation coefficient between CPI inflation and
the nominal interest rate (Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield) is 0.42 (0.55) at yearly (quarterly)
frequency.
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MCz
in case of survival on the other hand; the intuitive implication is that high productivity
growth goes along with high potential profitability. Hence, from H3, profitable firms operating
in industries with high realized productivity growth are expected to react more sensitively to
nominal fluctuations, and, from H5, such fluctuations should affect sectoral TFP-growth more
severely in industries with a better historical productivity performance.
We apply 3-digit industry-level data for the US to investigate these hypotheses. The pro-
ductivity of US industrial sectors is measured by the yearly growth rate of real value added
per industry from the UNIDO (2002) industrial statistics database. The yearly data are avail-
able for 28 industries from 1963-2000.34 The classification of 3-digit US industries with respect
to average volatility (standard deviation) and average growth of productivity in our sample
are reported in Table 7. The correlation coefficient between these two rankings is positive 0.23
(s.e.=0.03) and significantly different from zero at a 1% level according to Spearman’s rank cor-
relation test. Hence, independence of both rankings is rejected, confirming that more volatile
sectors tend to be characterized by higher average productivity growth.35 Therefore, identify-
ing industries that are highly exposed to the advanced technology (in the sense of a high ωyyz)
with volatile and strongly growing sectors, we operationalize our empirical analysis by means
of H5: We divide the sample according to the median, the first and the fourth quartile of both
measures. According to our theoretical model, the differential impact of inflation on TFP-
growth across the relevant subsamples should result from the different sensitivity of corporate
liquidity holdings in response to nominal fluctuations and is expected to be more pronounced in
the 14 (7) industries whose volatility/average productivity growth is above the median (in the
first quartile). We control for industry-specific fixed effects in all estimations. Since the first
lag of the growth rate (or level) of value added is not significant at conventional levels in any
specification, we employ a static panel estimation. That is, we estimate the following model:
yi,t = α+ β1pit−1 + β2(pit−1 ∗DVi) + β3Xt + ηi + i,t, i = 1, 2, ..., N, t = 1, 2, ..., T, (21)
where yi,t is the growth rate of real value added per industry, pit−1 the first lag of inflation, DVi
a dummy which amounts to one for industries with an above median (first quartile) volatil-
ity/mean, Xt a vector of aggregate control variables, N = 28 the number of cross-sections,
T = 38 the number of time-periods, ηi industry-specific fixed effects, i,t the error term and α
and β parameters to be estimated.36 We cluster the error terms at the industry level so that the
standard errors are robust to within-group (serial) correlation.37 Inflation is measured as the
change in the economywide consumer price index; we include the first lag of inflation due to the
potential endogeneity of contemporaneous measures. Furthermore, we include the contempora-
neous level and the first lag of the growth rate of GDP (GDP−growth), the private investment
share (inv − share) and the amount of overall credit (credit) as control variables. The latter
34We have to confine ourselves with yearly data since, to our knowledge, quarterly data on value added at
industry level are not available. Moreover, note that we deflate the value added series in each sector with the
economywide GDP-deflator.
35Among the ten most volatile sectors, we find industries such as professional & scientific equipment, petroleum
refineries, plastic products, industrial chemicals, iron and steel or non-ferrous metals. In contrast, the four least
volatile sectors are food products, other chemicals, beverages and printing and publishing.
36We also included a linear time trend, but it is not significant at conventional levels. Moreover, allowing for
year fixed effects would have considerably reduced the degrees of freedom.
37Consequently, our results are not subject to the caveat raised by Moulton (1990).
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variable is often used as a proxy for the degree of financial market development in the literature.
Results: The first column in Table 8 reports the correlation between the first lag of inflation
and the growth rate of real value added for the full sample. We find that a 1% increase in the
economywide rate of inflation triggers, on average, a drop in the sectoral growth rate of real value
added by 0.96% after controlling for changes in (lagged) GDP-growth, the private investment
share and the overall supply of credit. The next two columns contrast the sensitivity of value
added growth with respect to inflation in high and low volatility sectors (above/below median).
Consistent with H2, we detect that the negative impact of inflation is significant in both
subsamples, but on average 61% higher in the 14 highly volatile sectors. In order to test for a
statistical significance of the difference between both coefficients, we interact the lag of inflation
with a dummy variable which amounts to one for high volatility industries (according to the
median) and zero otherwise. Column four reveals that the interaction is negative and significant
on a 10% level. That is, the distorting impact of an 1% increase in inflation aggravates, on
average, by 0.32% if we focus on high volatility as opposed to low volatility sectors. This effect
is even more pronounced if we compare the sensitivity in the seven most volatile sectors with
the one in the residual 21 sectors (column five). In particular, the sensitivity of value added
growth per industry with respect to inflation is, on average, 76% higher in the seven most
volatile sectors. The difference is significant on a 5% level. Thus, as predicted by H2, we are
able to link the inflation-sensitivity of sectoral TFP-growth to the average sectoral volatility
of productivity growth per industry. Columns six to seven of Table 8 classify the impact of
inflation on productivity growth according to the median and first quartile of the observed
average productivity growth of a given industry in the sample. In accordance with H3 and H5,
column six reports that the negative impact of inflation is more pronounced in industries whose
average productivity growth is above the sample median. Yet, the difference is not significant
at conventional levels. Moreover, the coefficient is neither significant nor even positive if we
focus on the seven sectors that experienced the highest average productivity increase in the
sample.
Overall, the results emerging from the analysis of industry-level data corroborate our the-
oretical predictions that the negative effect of inflation on TFP-growth varies systematically
with the riskiness of physical investment portfolios across industrial sectors as measured by the
sectoral volatility of value added growth. In particular, we interpret these findings as supportive
for our theoretical model’s distinction between the basic technology, which is normalized to be
free of liquidity risk, and the advanced technology, where there is a superior growth potential,
but where idiosyncratic liquidity shocks give rise to a corporate demand for (partial) insurance
against such risk. In the next subsection, we will revisit the specific implications arising from
this setup on the basis of firm-level data.
6.2 Firm level
Data and methodology: Firm-level data allow for the most direct test of the specific trans-
mission mechanism proposed by our model. Specifically, our theory predicts that firms react to
nominal distortions which increase the liquidity premium by reducing their liquidity holdings
used to hedge advanced investment projects (H1) and by shifting their investment portfolios
towards more secure, but also less productive projects. Thus, we expect that increased corpo-
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rate liquidity holdings augment the investment in superior projects, while increased nominal
interest rates, notably as a consequence of higher (expected) rates of inflation, reduce corporate
liquidity holdings and trigger an adverse investment composition effect.
In order to test these hypotheses, we match the relevant variables employed in Section 3
with US firm-level data at quarterly as well as yearly frequency from the Compustat database.
The latter data relate to the balance sheets of US non-financial firms and cover the effective
time periods 1989:1-2000:4 and 1970-2000, respectively. In detail, we include the following
firm-level data: R&D expenses, the amount of corporate liquidity measured as the sum of cash
and marketable securities (corp. liquidity) and the amount of total assets (assets).38 Here,
R&D is used as a proxy for investment in superior technologies.39 The assets variable, in turn,
reflects overall corporate assets and thus controls for firm size. As hinted above, we use the
US CPI-based rate of inflation and the yield on corporate bonds to investigate the effect of
these macroeconomic variables on firm-level liquidity and investment portfolios.40 In addition,
where available, we exploit information on individual firms’ S&P credit rating (spdrc)41 as an
additional control variable to isolate the effect of firm-specific credit conditions relative to the
aggregate measure for the lending rate faced by non-financial firms.
In this context, we again point out the empirical evidence provided by Opler et al. (1999)
based on yearly US firm-level data for 1970-1993. The authors proxy a firm’s investment
opportunities by its market-to-book value and/or its expenses for R&D, respectively; the risk
associated with a firm’s cash flow is measured by the standard deviation of its cash flows. The
study finds that the value of liquid assets (cash and marketable securities) relative to total net
assets averages at 18% for US non-financial firms. Furthermore, it establishes that firms with
higher growth opportunities and riskier cash flows hold on average more liquid assets.42 We see
these empirical findings as strongly supportive of the relevance of corporate liquidity holdings
for the purpose of insuring superior, but risky production activities. Against this background,
we extend the analysis in Opler et al. (1999) by investigating the impact of inflation and
nominal interest rates on corporate liquidity holdings and firm-level R&D expenses.
We have a balanced panel of over 150000 (97000) observations at quarterly (yearly) fre-
quency.43 We employ the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference (GMM − dif) as well as
the Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM system estimator (GMM−sys) because of the significance
of the lagged dependent variable (e.g. lagged R&D levels).44 These estimation procedures are
38The qualitative results are robust to the inclusion of additional firm-level control variables such as operating
income before taxes and interest payments, the amount of long-run outstanding debt or interest payments.
39If we interpret investment in superior technologies as investment in new technologies, while investment in less
productive projects reflects production with established technologies, R&D expenses are the most appropriate
candidate for an approximation of advanced investments projects.
40We stress that our standard errors are robust to serial correlation and hence are not subject to the caveat
raised by Moulton (1990).
41The variable is an index number, ranging from 1 to 30 in our sample, whereby a higher value corresponds
to a poorer credit rating.
42Notice that these latter findings relate to a sample comprising firms irrespective of the industrial sector
they belong to. In contrast, our own empirical prediction (H2) was empirically tested by means of industrial
subaggregates. Hence, there is no inconsistency between the results in Opler et al. (1999) and our own findings
reported in Section 6.1.
43Unfortunately, the S&P credit rating index is only available for roughly 12000 time observations.
44Similarly, Aghion et al. (2006) apply a (country-) panel estimation based on yearly data to test for business
cycle effects of volatility.
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based on the general method of moments (GMM) and are constructed to yield consistent esti-
mates in dynamic panels. In particular, Arellano and Bond (1991) estimate a dynamic panel
data model in first differences and apply appropriate lagged levels as instruments for the first
differences of the endogenous variables. These are valid instruments if (i) the time-varying
disturbance i,t is not serially correlated, and (ii) the explanatory variables Xi,t are weakly
exogenous.45 In all estimations, we employ heteroscedasticity- and serial correlation robust
standards errors. Finally, note that the mix of macroeconomic and microeconomic data allows
for an inspection of causality. More specifically, the coefficient of inflation reflects the causal
impact on an individual firm’s (marginal) R&D expenses since the latter have no feedback effect
on the aggregate level of inflation.
Results: In all estimations, we reject the presence of second-order autocorrelation. Further-
more, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions never rejects the validity of the instruments.
Hence, all estimation specifications appear to be well-specified.46 Table 9 summarizes our main
results for the dynamic panel estimations at quarterly frequency.47 In the first two columns,
we use the amount of corporate liquidity as the dependent variable. The first column reports
a negative coefficient of inflation, which is not significant at conventional levels, however. The
second column displays a negative impact of the nominal interest rate on corporate liquidity
holdings, which is significant on a 5% level. This coefficient suggests that, averaging across
firms, a 1% increase in the nominal interest rate reduces liquidity holdings per firm by almost
1.4 million US$ in the same quarter. In particular, our estimation results are consistent with
proposition H1 derived in the context of the agency problem underlying our theoretical model.
In both cases, we control for firm size (total assets), which - not surprisingly - has a positive
effect on liquidity holdings.
The remaining columns of Table 9 have R&D expenses per firm as the dependent variable.
45In other words, considering the following dynamic panel data model in first differences:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = α(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) + β(Xi,t −Xi,t−1) + (i,t − i,t−1), i = 1, 2, ..., N, t = 3, 4, ..., T,
the basic assumptions of Arellano and Bond (1991) are E[yi,t−s(i,t− i,t−1)] = 0, E[Xi,t−s(i,t− i,t−1)] = 0 for
s ≥ 2; t = 3, ...T , where yi,t is the dependent variable, Xi,t a vector of endogenous and exogenous explanatory
variables, N the number of cross-sections, T the number of time-periods, i,t the error term and α and β
parameters to be estimated. In addition, Blundell and Bond (1998) apply supplementary moment restrictions
on the original model in levels, whereby lagged differences are used as additional instruments for the endogenous
and predetermined variables in levels. [For practical purposes, we impose one instrument for each variable
and lag distance (collapse option), rather than one for each time period, variable, and lag distance in the
case of the GMM system estimator. This restriction on the IV-matrix reduces efficiency, but increases the
number of overidentifying restrictions which are used to test for the validity of the instruments (Hansen test).
Moreover, we limit the number of lags to six in the case of the Arellano-Bond estimator.] Given that E[yi,t, µi]
is mean stationary, the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator incorporates the additional moment restrictions
E[(yi,t−1− yi,t−2)(ηi+ i,t)] = 0, E[(Xi,t−1−Xi,t−2)(ηi+ i,t)] = 0, which requires the additional assumption of
no correlation between the differences of these variables and the country-specific effect. The authors show that
this procedure is more efficient if explanatory variables are persistent; however, the estimator requires mean
stationarity.
46As explained above, inflation and the nominal interest rate are considered as exogenous variables. The
microeconomic variables are considered as (potentially) endogenous.
47The same qualitative results obtain also for OLS or static fixed effects estimations. However, both estimators
are inconsistent in our setting due to the presence of aggregate variables in a dynamic disaggregate panel
framework.
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The third column illustrates that inflation has a negative causal impact on firm-level invest-
ments in R&D; the coefficient is significant on a 5% level. Keeping the amount of total assets
fixed, a 1% increase in inflation reduces R&D expenses per firm on average by 0.9 million US$.
Moreover, as evidenced by the positive coefficient on total assets, larger firms invest more in
R&D. In view of the comprehensive empirical evidence48 that larger firms have better outside
financing opportunities, this suggests that R&D investments are constrained by a firm’s financ-
ing opportunities. Importantly, the fourth column demonstrates that the distorting effect of
inflation declines if we control for the amount of corporate liquidity holdings. We find that
the coefficient of inflation is cut by one half and not significant any more at conventional lev-
els. At the same time, an increase in liquid assets per firm enhances investments in superior
technologies; the corresponding coefficient is significant on a 1% level.49
In the next two columns of Table 9, we repeat the same exercise, using the yield on corpo-
rate bonds rather than inflation as the measure of nominal distortions. The nominal interest
rate has a negative impact on firm-level R&D expenses; the corresponding coefficient is sig-
nificant on a 1% level. Again, the effect is smaller in absolute terms and loses significance at
conventional levels if firm-level liquid assets are controlled for. Finally, in the last column of
Table 9, again resorting to the rate of inflation as the key explanatory variable, we include the
S&P credit rating index as an additional control variable. This reduces the effective sample
to 7482 observations since the rating is only available for a subset of firms. The coefficient of
the index reveals that a downgrading in the credit rating reduces R&D expenditures, though
not significantly. We point out that the adverse effect of inflation on R&D expenses increases
and is even significant at a 1% level for the relevant subset of firms. Overall, the quarterly
firm-level results are consistent with the specific transmission mechanism proposed in our the-
oretical model in that increases in inflation or interest rates reduce investment in advanced
projects (R&D). Moreover, as demonstrated by the differential coefficient pattern depending
on whether corporate liquidity holdings are switched on or off as a control variable, such liq-
uidity buffer stocks are indeed a quantitatively relevant transmission channel for the effect of
nominal fluctuations on the composition of firms’ investment portfolios.
In Table 10, we report the firm-level evidence for data recorded at yearly frequency. The
outline of the results follows the same logic as for Table 9. The first two columns reveal that
an increase in either inflation or nominal interest rates substantially reduces corporate liquidity
holdings. The two relevant coefficients are both significant on a 5% level. Moreover, inflation
reduces R&D investment per firm. At a yearly frequency, the corresponding coefficient suggests
that a 1% increase in inflation reduces a firm’s R&D expenses on average by 0.47 million US$.50
The distortionary effect of inflation declines by 20% if we additionally control for liquidity
holdings per firm.51 The direct effect of corporate liquidity holdings on R&D is close to the
one at quarterly frequency and significant at a 1% level. In contrast to the quarterly findings,
the coefficient of the nominal interest rate in the R&D regression, though still negative, is not
48Compare e.g. Hubbard (1998) and the references therein.
49Note that all qualitative results are also robust to the inclusion of industry rather than firm fixed effects;
results are available from the authors upon request.
50We employ the Arellano-Bond estimator since the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is close
to one, indicating problems with the stationarity of R&D at yearly frequency which would contaminate the
Blundell-Bond estimator.
51Yet, the decline in the inflation-coefficient is not statistically significant.
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significant at conventional levels; there is even a sign switch if liquid assets are controlled for.
In the last two columns of Table 10, we systematically exploit the information of the S&P
credit rating. Specifically, we split the sample into two subsets: (i) firms with a ”sound” credit
ranking (below 12) and (ii) firms with a ”poor” one (above 12). Following the logic of our
model, one would expect that the negative impact of inflation on R&D is more pronounced for
firms with worse access to external finance since the precautionary holding of marketable assets
for the purpose of hedging liquidity risk becomes more important. Indeed, columns seven and
eight display that the distortionary impact of inflation is six times higher for firms with a poor
credit rating. Furthermore, a deterioration in the credit rating has a negative direct effect on
R&D investments for the subset of firms with a relatively bad credit rating, while the effect is
not significant for the subset of better-rated firms.
Summing up, the firm-level results show that inflation has a negative impact on firm-level
investment in superior technologies. However, this effect disappears if corporate holdings of
cash and marketable securities and individual firms’ outside financing opportunities are con-
trolled for. Thus, the impact of inflation on compositional investment decisions at the firm-level
is actually due to variations in a firm’s liquidity holdings and outside financing opportuni-
ties. Together with the results from the previous industry-level analysis, the empirical firm-
level findings provide strong evidence in favor of the microeconomic mechanism underlying
our theoretical propositions regarding the aggregate relation between inflation and investment
composition-driven TFP-growth at business cycle frequency.
7 Concluding remarks
The main contribution of this paper is to document a negative causal effect of inflation on TFP
at business cycle frequency and to propose a model to structurally rationalize this effect. On the
basis of US quarterly and yearly time series data, we provide detailed empirical evidence sup-
porting the hypothesis that nominal distortions have a negative effect on TFP-growth. We then
propose a monetary business cycle model allowing for endogenous technology choice between a
safe, but return-dominated technology and a superior technology which yields higher expected
returns, but is subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Insurance against such liquidity risk
is possible by holding a buffer stock of liquid assets, but an agency problem prevents complete
insurance, whereby the scope for insurance is endogenously determined via the relative price
for liquidity. In this environment, we demonstrate how nominal fluctuations affect not only
the overall amount, but also the composition of aggregate investment and the degree to which
advanced investments are hedged against liquidity risk. The direct consequence is an effect
on aggregate productivity. Next, we show that the proposed monetary transmission mecha-
nism as well as the model’s equilibrium implications for corporate liquidity holdings and the
composition of physical investment are consistent with US industry-level and firm-level panel
data. Using industry-level data, we find that sectoral TFP-growth responds more sensitively
to nominal fluctuations (i) in more volatile sectors and (ii) in sectors that are characterized
by a relatively high historical TFP-growth. From firm-level data, we infer that investments in
superior technologies, proxied by firm-level R&D expenses, (i) decline if the level of inflation
or nominal interest rates increases and (ii) are positively related to corporate liquidity hold-
ings. We regard these empirical findings as strongly supportive of our proposed transmission
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mechanism.
On the basis of numerical exercises we infer that monetary policy shocks can account for
a significant proportion of the variations in TFP. In fact, the benchmark calibration of our
model implies that some 17% of the variability in aggregate productivity can be attributed to
monetary shocks. Consequently, our findings suggest that the role of monetary policy shocks
for macroeconomic fluctuations has been underestimated. While the present paper’s focus is on
the business cycle implications of the investment-composition driven effects of monetary shocks,
both the empirical analysis of US aggregate data and the analysis of our model indicate that
also higher steady state rates of inflation have adverse implications on the evolution of TFP.
In a companion paper, Evers, Niemann and Schiffbauer (2007), we therefore elaborate on the
endogenous growth implications of our proposed transmission mechanism and, using country-
level panel data, identify a robust negative causal effect of inflation on long-run TFP-growth.
Our explanation is that inflation acts as a tax on the provision of liquidity to the corporate
sector and thereby affects not only the capital accumulation decision, but also the technology
choice decision which shapes the evolution of aggregate productivity.52
On more general grounds, the striking empirical evidence of a negative causal influence of
monetary variables (inflation and nominal interest rates, respectively) on both short-run fluc-
tuations and long-run growth rates of TFP fundamentally questions the orthodox modelling
strategy of treating money supply shocks and shocks to aggregate technology, identified as a
residual category labelled TFP, as orthogonal.53 Against this background, there is a need for
more theoretical and empirical work in order to better understand the implications of com-
positional variations in the utilization of production factors and their dependence on nominal
macroeconomic conditions. In the present paper, we have stressed one relevant margin; com-
plementary issues relating to government policies other than monetary policy as well as to
the market environment in which (heterogenous) firms dynamically interact deserve particular
attention.
52Compare Erosa (2001) for a similar argument.
53Implicitly, this insight already underlies the work by Fischer (1993).
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Appendix
A Competitive equilibrium and financial contracting
Below, we present the optimality conditions characterizing the solution to the model economy’s
agents’ decision problems, lay out the details of the financial contracting scheme between en-
trepreneurs and the financial intermediary and then define a competitive equilibrium.
A.1 Optimal decisions: Households
The solution to the household problem (4) can be summarized by a set of optimality condi-
tions which determine the household’s equilibrium behavior. First, there is the Euler equation
describing the optimal intertemporal allocation of nominal wealth:
Et−
{
uc(c
H
t , h
H
t )
Pt
− βR˜tuc(c
H
t+1, h
H
t+1)
Pt+1
}
= 0 (22)
Next, there are two Euler equations which determine the sequence of dynamic decisions between
consumption and technology-specific capital investments; for i = k, z, they read:
uc(cHt , h
H
t ) [1 + Φ2(it, it+1)] = βEt
{
uc(cHt+1, h
H
t+1) [(1− δ)− Φ1(it+1, it+2)] + β
uc(cHt+2, h
H
t+2)
Pt+2
Rit+1
}
(23)
An immediate implication of the two equations (23) is that the technology-specific returns to
capital must be equal in expectation, i.e. Et{Rkt+1} = Et{Rzt+1} = Et{Rt+1}. Similarly, there
are two optimality conditions which govern the household’s consumption-leisure choice, thus
pinning down the optimal supply of labor to either production plan i = k, z:
uh(c
H
t , h
H
t ) +
[
θ
uc(c
H
t , h
H
t )
Pt
+ (1− θ)βEt
{
uc(c
H
t+1, h
H
t+1)
Pt+1
}]
W i,Ht = 0 (24)
Here, it follows that, in all states of the world, the technology-specific wage rates must be
identical because the household cares only about aggregate labor supply; hence, we haveW k,Ht =
W z,Ht = W
H
t .
A.2 Optimal decisions: Entrepreneurs
Basic technology: The entrepreneur’s problem (5) when employing the basic technology
reduces to a standard classical production plan: By constant returns to scale, efficient fac-
tor employment implies that marginal costs are independent of the quantity produced, i.e.
C(W kt , R
k
t , R˜t; y
k
t ) = MC
k
t (W
k
t , R
k
t , R˜t; 1)y
k
t . Then, from the assumption of perfectly competi-
tive intermediate goods markets, it follows that the price of the basic intermediate good equals
marginal costs, i.e. P kt = MC
k
t (W
k
t , R
k
t , R˜t). From the Cobb-Douglas specification of ϕ(kt, l
k
t ),
optimal factor demands for the basic production plan are:
kt =
αkP kt y
k
t
Rkt
and lkt =
(1− αk)P kt ykt
[1 + θ(R˜t − 1)]W kt
(25)
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Finally, the price for the basic intermediate good is:
P kt =
1
At
(
Rkt
αk
)αk (
[1 + θ(R˜t − 1)]W kt
(1− αk)
)(1−αk)
(26)
Advanced technology: Production by means of the advanced technology is subject to an
entrepreneurial ex post moral hazard problem. This agency problem is dealt with via a financial
contract whose specification closely follows Homstro¨m and Tirole (1998) and is described next.
A.3 Financial contracting
Optimal factor input ratio and the cost function: Part of an optimal contract must be to
use factor inputs in a cost minimizing combination. Since factor demands are determined via the
constrained-efficient contract Ct solving program (7), they will not only reflect the entrepreneur’s
profit maximization objective, but also the intermediary’s need to break even in expectation.
From the Cobb-Douglas specification, the possibility of project failure then requires that factors
earn constant shares not of project revenue, but of the total costs C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
associated
with a targeted production scale y˜zt . Hence, the demands for capital and labor to be employed
in a generic advanced project are:
zt =
αzC
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
Rzt
and lzt =
(1− αz)C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
[1 + θ(R˜t − 1)]W zt
(27)
Furthermore, from constant returns to scale and the Cobb-Douglas specification of the tech-
nology, we can write:
C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
=MCzt
(
Wt, R
z
t , R˜t
)
y˜zt =
1
Vt
(
Rt
αz
)αz (
[1 + θ(R˜t − 1)]W zt
(1− αz)
)(1−αz)
y˜zt ,
where MCzt (·) are the per unit costs of producing a targeted output level y˜zt ; since the technol-
ogy displays constant returns to scale, these per unit costs coincide with marginal costs. As a
consequence, the program to find the optimal contract is linear in the project size y˜zt .
First best - the socially optimal contract: Consider the first best contract where b = 0
such that the entrepreneurial moral hazard problem plays no role, but liquidity is scarce and
has an opportunity cost R˜t. The questions asked here are: What is the maximum overall return
on investment? And how does the corresponding socially optimal contract look like? Suppose
for the moment a binding participation constraint for the investor; indeed, we will later verify
that this is the case in a well-specified problem.54 Substituting from the binding participation
constraint (7b) into the entrepreneur’s net return (7a) yields:
ΠFt =
[∫
Γt(ξt)
P zt
MCzt (·)
(
1− ξtR˜t
)
dG(ξt)− 1
]
MCzt (·)y˜zt
54By well-specified, we mean (i) that there is no self-financing, and (ii) that the solution to the constrained-
optimal contract features a finite investment level.
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Let ξˆt denote the cutoff value for the liquidity shock such that the project is continued if and
only if ξt ≤ ξˆt; using this rule for the indicator function Γt(ξt) then allows to rewrite the
entrepreneur’s net return as:
ΠFt (ξˆt) = λt(ξˆt)MC
z
t (·)y˜zt , (28a)
where:
λt(ξˆt) ≡
[∫ ξˆt
0
P zt
MCzt (·)
(
1− ξtR˜t
)
dG(ξt)− 1
]
(28b)
In definition (28b), λt(ξˆt) denotes the net social marginal return on one unit invested in the
individual advanced project, given a cutoff value ξˆt. Since
P zt
MCzt (·) > 0, λ(ξˆt) is maximized at the
socially optimal cutoff value ξˆFBt =
1
R˜t
. Moreover, from (28a), it is clear that the entrepreneur
is the residual claimant and receives the full social surplus from the project.
Second best - entrepreneurial moral hazard: Now consider the case where b > 0.
Notice that general equilibrium considerations imply that the marginal net social return under
both the first and the second best solution must be positive.55 Then, given a positive value
for λt(ξˆt), the entrepreneur will seek to maximize Π
F
t (ξˆt) by choosing the maximum investment
volume MCzt (·)y˜zt that still guarantees investor participation. But from (7b), this is achieved
by maximizing the state contingent per unit transfer τt(ξt) to the investor. Accordingly, the
second best contract prescribes to retain the minimum amount of profits that is still consistent
with incentive compatibility. Hence, the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility constraint (7c)
is binding at the maximum pledgeable unit return:
τt(ξt) =
Γt(ξt)(1− b)P zt y˜zt
MCzt (·)y˜zt
(29)
We can now solve for the largest investment volumeMCzt (·)y˜zt that is compatible with both the
investor’s participation constraint and the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint by substituting
(29) into the investor’s participation constraint (7b) to obtain:[
1−
∫
Γ(ξt)
(
(1− b)− ξtR˜t
) P zt
MCzt (·)
dG(ξt)
]
MCzt (·)y˜zt = Et (30)
Here, the expression in squared brackets represents the difference between marginal cost of
investment to an outside investor and the expected marginal return to such outside investment.
Let ξˆ0t ≡ (1−b)R˜t denote the cutoff value that maximizes the expected marginal return to out-
side investors, and note that (30) implies that, given some Et > 0, the expected (subject to
55To see this, suppose to the contrary that λ(ξˆFBt ) ≤ 0 such that the optimal contract would prescribe
zt = lzt = 0, i.e. zero investment for any level of entrepreneurial equity Et. However, this implies y˜
z
t = 0 which
contradicts a general equilibrium with positive consumption and investment, and the price of the advanced
intermediate good would adjust such as to guarantee a positive marginal net social return. By the same token,
the second best solution must also involve a cutoff rule ξˆt with positive marginal net social return.
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idiosyncratic liquidity shocks) marginal return on outside investment is strictly smaller than
one.56
Solving (30) for the maximum investment volume conditional on a given cutoff value ξˆt,
allows to write the project’s investment capacity as:
MCzt (·)y˜zt = µt(ξˆt)Et, (31a)
where:
µt(ξˆt) ≡ 1
1− ∫ ξˆt
0
(
(1− b)− ξtR˜t
)
P zt
MCzt (·)dG(ξt)
(31b)
is an equity multiplier, whose denominator specifies the amount of internal funds that the
entrepreneur has to contribute per unit of investment in order to compensate the outside
investor for the shortfall implied by the expression in squared brackets in (30). Finally, using
(28a) and (31a), the entrepreneur’s expected net payoff becomes:
ΠFt (ξˆt) = λt(ξˆt)µt(ξˆt)Et (32)
It now remains to determine the second best continuation threshold, to be denoted ξˆ∗t . Given
an entrepreneurial equity position Et, the second best cutoff ξˆ
∗
t maximizes (32). It is clear that
ξˆ∗t ∈ [ξˆ0t , ξˆFBt ]: If ξt < ξˆ0t , both parties prefer to continue ex post because both parties can
realize gains on the sunk stage one investment; if ξt > ξˆ
FB
t , both parties prefer to abandon the
project because the net social marginal return of continuing is negative. Within the interval
[ξˆ0t , ξˆ
FB
t ], there emerges a trade-off: On the one hand, increasing ξˆt implies that continuation is
possible in more contingencies, and thus the marginal net social return λt(ξˆt) on each unit of
initial investment is increased. On the other hand, decreasing ξˆt allows to increase the amount
of initial investment MCzt (·)y˜zt by increasing the equity multiplier µt(ξˆt). After substitution
from the definitions (28b) and (31b) into (32), it is straightforward to show that the optimal
continuation value ξˆ∗t can be found as the solution to the following problem:
min
ξˆt
R˜t
∫ ξˆt
0
ξtdG(ξt) +
MCzt (·)
P zt
G(ξˆt)
, (33)
which has the interpretation that the second best cutoff value minimizes the expected unit cost
of total expected investment. The first order condition to this problem is:∫ ξˆ∗t
0
G(ξt)dξt =
MCzt (·)
P zt
1
R˜t
(34)
56Indeed, if this was not the case, investment would be self-financing and there would be no demand for
liquidity at all in that the investor’s participation constraint would be non-binding. A sufficient condition for
ruling out self-financing is:
∫ ξˆ0t
0
(
(1− b)− ξtR˜t
)
P zt
MCzt (·)dG(ξt) < 1. Observe that rewriting this condition yields
λt(ξˆ0t ) < b
P zt
MCzt (·)G(ξˆ
0
t ); then, it is apparent that ξˆ
FB
t = ξˆ
0
t if b = 0, which leads to the conclusion that, in order
to rule out self-financing, a positive wedge ξˆFBt − ξˆ0t > 0 and therefore b > 0 are essential.
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Finally, using the optimality condition for the cutoff value allows to rewrite the entrepreneur’s
expected net return in the following compact form:
ΠFt (ξˆ
∗
t ) =
1
R˜t
− ξˆ∗t
ξˆ∗t − (1−b)R˜t
Et =
ξˆFBt − ξˆ∗t
ξˆ∗t − ξˆ0t
Et (35)
Observe how this expression reflects the trade-off underlying the choice of ξˆ∗t ∈ [ξˆ0t , ξˆFBt ]. For
reference, we define the expected net return per unit of entrepreneurial equity Et as:
Π˜Ft (ξˆ
∗
t ) ≡
1
R˜t
− ξˆ∗t
ξˆ∗t − (1−b)R˜t
Since the optimal contract is linear in the individual entrepreneur’s equity position, any
individual entrepreneur’s conditions are also relevant in the aggregate. As a result, the first
order condition (34) pins down the price level for the intermediate goods produced by means
of the advanced technology:
P zt =
1
R˜t
∫ ξˆ∗t
0
G(ξt)dξt
1
Vt
(
Rzt
αz
)αz (
[1 + θ(R˜t − 1)]W zt
(1− αz)
)(1−αz)
(36)
A.4 Implementation and discussion of second best policy
Aggregating across advanced projects, we can derive two measures of aggregate liquidity de-
mand. The first one is relevant if liquidity provision is organized in a way that disregards the
scope for risk sharing across entrepreneurs:
D¯t = ξˆ
∗
tP
z
t y˜
z
t (37a)
In contrast, the second measure of overall liquidity demand is relevant if liquidity risk can be
pooled across projects:
D∗t =
[∫ ξˆ∗t
0
ξtg(ξt)dξt
]
P zt y˜
z
t < D¯t (37b)
It is clear that this latter concept requires some form of financial intermediation. Hence,
drawing on Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998), we turn to the institutional details supporting the
implementation of the second best policy.
One possibility is to have the financial intermediary initially extend the amountMCzt (·)y˜zt −
Et to the entrepreneur together with an irrevocable line of credit of maximum size ξˆ
∗
tP
z
t y˜
z
t to
be drawn from as needed at the interim stage. Given our assumptions on the details of the
moral hazard problem which does not envisage distraction of resources on the part of the
entrepreneur, this credit line implements the second best solution as long as it is provided
free of charge, irrespective of the amount ξtP
z
t y˜
z
t ≤ ξˆ∗tP zt y˜zt of liquidity actually requested.
Since the liquidity shocks are independent across projects, the aggregate amount of resources
needed to cover refinancing needs at the interim stage is then given by D∗t . At the level of
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an individual entrepreneur, an alternative would be via a liquidity covenant which involves the
financial intermediary initially extending the amount [1 + (P zt /MC
z
t (·))ξˆ∗t ]MCzt (·)y˜zt − Et to
the entrepreneur, whereby the requirement is imposed that the amount ξˆ∗tP
z
t y˜
z
t is not sunk in
the project, but kept in the form of readily marketable assets. However, at the aggregate level
across all projects, implementation of the second best policy via liquidity covenants is seen to
require strictly more resources D¯t > D
∗
t because liquidity is kept separately for each project,
thus forgoing the potential to pool liquidity across them.57
Given our empirical interest, the question arises whether there is a second best policy which
features the productive sector (rather than the intermediary) holding liquidity. We now give an
example for such a policy. For that purpose, first define a number ξˇt which is implicitly given
by D∗t = ξˇtP
z
t y˜
z
t ; then, a policy of the desired kind is constructed as follows: At stage one,
the intermediary extends the amount [1 + (P zt /MC
z
t (·))ξˇt]MCzt (·)y˜zt − Et to the entrepreneur.
The financial contract further stipulates that the amount ξˇtP
z
t y˜
z
t must be held in the form of
liquid assets. The entrepreneur will then use the obtained external finance to complement her
own equity position Et sunk in the project by the maximum admissible amount MC
z
t (·)y˜zt −Et
and deposit her remaining liquid assets with the intermediary (at zero interest). Now, at stage
two, when hit by a liquidity shock ξt, the entrepreneur must first use up her own asset position
of ξˇtP
z
t y˜
z
t ; only then can she approach the intermediary for additional funds, which the latter
will residually provide up to the second best quantity ξˆ∗tP
z
t y˜
z
t . The intermediary is able to
provide this liquidity by calling idle funds from those projects who receive shocks ξt < ξˇt.
Obviously, this policy replicates the second best in terms of both the initial investment scale
and the cutoff ξˆ∗t . Thus, it only remains to check whether above arrangement is feasible, which
is the case since, from the definition of ξˇt, the supply of and demand for liquidity are equal at
the aggregate level: P zt y˜
z
t ξˇt = D
∗
t = P
z
t y˜
z
t
∫ ξˆ∗t
0
ξtg(ξt)dξt. Further variations on the institutional
structure implementing the second best, involving advanced sector projects holding assets other
than cash (e.g. corporate debt issued by the basic sector firms) as well as liquid assets earning
non-zero rates of retun, are possible.
A.5 Competitive equilibrium
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium) Given initial conditions {k0, z0, A0,M0} and re-
alizations for aggregate shocks {At,Vt,Jt}∞t=0 and idiosyncratic shocks {ξit}∞t=0, a competitive
equilibrium is a list of allocations {cHt , hk,Ht , hz,Ht , xt, kt+1, zt+1, Qt,Mt+1}∞t=0 to households and
{(cEt , hk,Et , hz,Et , Et, At+1)i}∞t=0∀i to entrepreneurs, of technology-specific and economywide aggre-
gates {ct, lkt , lzt , Lt, Kt+1, ykt , yzt , yt}∞t=0 and of prices {Pt, P zt , P kt ,Wt,W kt ,W k,Ht ,W k,Et ,W zt ,W z,Ht ,
W z,Et , Rt, R
k
t , R
z
t , R˜t}∞t=0 such that:
1. given prices, the allocation solves the household problem (4) as well as the basic and
57In the benchmark section of their paper which features an exogenous supply of liquidity, Holmstro¨m and
Tirole (1998) establish equivalence of the two discussed methods of providing liquidity. This result stems from
the fact that their economy allows for a technology (”cash”) to transfer wealth across the stages of the financial
contracting problem and the additional assumption that ”cash” is not scarce. Conversely, in our economy ”cash”
is available, but its (limited) supply is determined in general equilibrium via households’ financial deposits and
monetary policy. Importantly then, liquidity is costly (it sells at a premium R˜t − 1 > 0), and agents have
an incentive to economize on its usage. The consequence is that intermediated credit lines and decentralized
corporate liquidity holdings are no longer equivalent.
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advanced production problems (5) and (7);
2. entrepreneurs follow their behavioral rules and the financial intermediary breaks even;
3. aggregation across agents and sectors as well as among the entrepreneurs obtains, i.e. for
a generic variable (vEt )
i belonging to the allocation to entrepreneurs:
∫
i
vE,it di = v
E
t ;
4. the financial market as well as the markets for final goods, intermediate goods and factor
inputs clear.
B TFP accounting
Our model assumes that entrepreneurial firms can employ two different Cobb-Douglas technolo-
gies which are homogenous in their two respective input factors, capital and labor: ϕ(kt, l
k
t ) =
(kt)
αk((1 + γ)tlkt )
(1−αk) and f(zt, lzt ) = (zt)
αz((1 + γ)tlzt )
(1−αz). Thus, the equations determining
the distinct intermediate outputs read ykt = Atϕ(kt, lkt ) and yzt = G(ξˆ∗t )y˜zt = VtG(ξˆ∗t )f(zt, lzt ).
Totally differentiating both equations and dropping time subscripts yields:
dyk = dAϕ(k, lk) +A (ϕk(k, lk)dk + ϕl(k, lk)dlk)
dyz =
(
dVG(·) + Vg(·)dξˆ∗
)
f(z, lz) + VG(·) (fz(z, lz)dz + fl(z, lz)dlz)
Dividing these equations by Aϕ(k, lk) and VG(·)f(z, lz), respectively, one obtains the approxi-
mate percentage deviations (denoted by hats) of the two intermediate outputs:
ŷk = Â+ αkk̂ + (1− αk)l̂k
ŷz = V̂ + ωG
ξˆ∗
̂ˆ
ξ∗ + αz ẑ + (1− αz)l̂z,
where x̂ ≡ dx
x
and where ωG
ξˆ∗
= g(ξˆ
∗)ξˆ∗
G(ξˆ∗)
denotes the elasticity of the survival probability with
respect to the cutoff value for liquidity shocks ξˆ∗. Since we measure TFP-growth by the part
of output growth which is not explained by the growth of the input factors, it follows that
productivity growth for the basic technology is:
T̂FP k = ŷk − αkk̂ − (1− αk)l̂k = Â,
where the first equality is an implication of the definition (in terms of subaggregates for the
respective intermediate goods) of TFP as the Solow residual. Similarly, for the advanced
technology, we get:
T̂FP z = ŷz − αz ẑ − (1− αz)l̂z = V̂ + ωG
ξˆ∗
̂ˆ
ξ∗
From these equations, we can deduce overall TFP-growth as the weighted sum of productivity
growth of the different technologies. Specifically, from (11), aggregate output is given by a CES
aggregation of the intermediate outputs produced with the different technologies. Aggregate
output growth can then be expressed as the composite of technology-specific growth rates:
ŷ = ζ
1
ρ
(
yk
y
) ρ−1
ρ
ŷk + (1− ζ) 1ρ
(
yz
y
) ρ−1
ρ
ŷz = ωyykŷ
k + ωyyzŷ
z
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Hence, combining the expression for aggregate output growth with the results for the interme-
diate output growth rates, aggregate TFP-growth, i.e. innovations to aggregate output growth
which cannot be attributed to changes in capital or labor growth, is measured as:
T̂FP = T̂ = ŷ − ωyyk
(
αkk̂ + (1− αk)l̂k
)
− ωyyz
(
αz ẑ + (1− αz)l̂z
)
= ωyykT̂FP
k + ωyyzT̂FP
z
= ωyykÂ+ ωyyz
(
V̂ + ωG
ξˆ∗
̂ˆ
ξ∗
)
C Calibration and data sources
To operationalize the calibration exercise, functional forms need to be specified. As to household
preferences, we postulate a Cobb-Douglas utility function in consumption cH and leisure (1−
hH):
u(cH , hH) =
1
1− σ
[
(cH)µ(1− hH)1−µ]1−σ , 0 < µ < 1
The production functions describing the two available technologies have already been intro-
duced with a Cobb-Douglas specification. Thus, it only remains to specify the adjustment cost
function associated with variations in the technology-specific capital stocks i = k, z:
Φ(it, it+1) =
φ
2
it
(
it+1 − it(1 + γ)
it
)2
,
which guarantees that, as the economy grows, the average resources spent in terms of adjust-
ment costs remain constant and that along a balanced growth path these costs are zero. Finally,
the exogenous productivity shocks to intermediate goods production are assumed to obey the
following autoregressive process:(
ln(At)
ln(Vt)
)
=
(
ρa 0
0 ρv
)(
ln(At−1)
ln(Vt−1)
)
+
(
0
(1− ρv)ln (χ)
)
+
(
a,t
v,t
)
(
a
v
)
∼ N
( (
0
0
)
,
(
σ2a σav
σav σ
2
v
) )
,
where χ is a measure of the productivity gap between the advanced sector and the basic sector
along the balanced growth path.
The parameters we set beforehand are the coefficient of relative risk aversion σ = 2 as well
as Ω and η which determine the relative importance of the entrepreneurs in the economy with
respect to their labor supply and their accumulated wealth; in view of the parametrizations
employed in the literature, we set Ω = 0.95 and η = 0.97.58 As to the parameters determined
from the data, we first resort to relevant time series for the US at quarterly frequency (1959:1-
2006:2) which were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2006) and the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (2006). Specifically, we set γ = 0.0037 to match the average growth rate of
58Compare e.g. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and the references therein.
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real output per hour worked over our sample of 0.37% per quarter and β = 0.98 to match the
average implied real interest rate - the difference between the nominal interest rate and the rate
of inflation - of 2.7% over this sample. The preference parameter µ = 0.167 is calibrated to be
on average consistent with the consumption-leisure FOC (24), while αk = αz = α = 0.31 are
set to match the labor share of income.59 Finally, δ = 0.0112 is pinned down such as to match
the average consumption of fixed capital. The investment adjustment cost parameter φ = 12.5
is determined such as to match the empirical volatility of aggregate investment of 5.60%.
The critical parameter for our analysis is the fraction θ of the firms’ wage bill that needs
to be paid in advance because it pins down the quantitative importance of liquidity relative
to overall short-term credit. We calibrate θ using the information on firms’ balance sheets
reported in Opler et al. (1999). There, the sample mean (median) of liquid assets over total
assets net of liquid assets is at 18% (6%), while total (= short-term plus long-term) leverage is
at 28% (25%). These numbers imply a ratio of liquid assets to total debt of 0.54 (0.23). The
corresponding model statistic is D
D+θWL
; we choose θ = 0.25 such that the steady state value
for this expression is at 0.36, falling in between the empirical reference statistics.
The composition of economic activity is mainly determined by the parameters ρ, ζ and
χ, which we calibrate from industry data, as well as by the agency cost parameter b and the
moments µξ, σξ of the liquidity shock distribution G(·), which is assumed to be lognormal. The
parameters b = 0.15, µξ = −0.75, σξ = 0.75 are jointly calibrated such as to generate a steady
state with (i) an advanced project survival rate of 83% (corresponding to a failure rate of 4.6%
across both technologies). In order to pin down the parameters ρ and ζ, we recover estimates for
these parameters using annual industry-level data from the UNIDO (2002) industry database
covering the period 1963-2000. These data provide disaggregate information on value added
and output prices at industry level according to the Standard Industrial Classicication (SIC)
system; we drop the government and the financial sector as well as industries with missing
data and are left with 36 industries (see Table 7). We organize these remaining industries into
two subaggregates, whereby the sorting criterion is the standard deviation of each industry’s
growth rate of value added over time. We interpret these subaggregates as the two intermediate
production technologies in our model economy and use the associated relative prices to infer
the parameters of interest from (12). In particular, from total differentiation of these relative
demand schedules, one obtains (with hats denoting relative changes):(̂
yi
y
)
= −ρ
(̂
P i
P
)
This allows to isolate the elasticity of substitution ρ = 1.66. Now, (12) and (14) can be solved
for the relative sectoral weights ζ = 0.73 and (1 − ζ) = 0.27 as well as the elasticities of
aggregate output with respect to the sectoral intermediate output levels:
ωyyk = ζ
1
ρ
(
yk
y
) ρ−1
ρ
and ωyyz = (1− ζ)
1
ρ
(
yz
y
) ρ−1
ρ
59The restriction αk = αz is imposed due to the lack of informative data. Note also that we treat en-
trepreneurs’ wage earnings as part of the overall labor earnings and that the labor share needs to be adjusted
since, due to the firms’ advance financing requirement, part of the income is used to pay interest; specifically,
we exploit the following steady state relation: labor share = (1−α)
[1+θ(R˜−1)] .
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The productivity difference parameter across the two subaggregates is estimated from the re-
spective value added data as χ = 1.26. Similarly, we exploit the time series properties of value
added in the two industrial subaggregates in order to parametrize the relevant stochastic pro-
cesses for technology. We directly infer ρa = 0.79, ρv = 0.66 and ρav = 0.67; the volatility
parameters σa and σv are also estimated from the relevant value added data, but adjusted
(keeping relative values constant) to be consistent with the volatility of aggregate TFP, which
yields σa = 0.0075 and σv = 0.0111. Finally, ρj = 0.35 and σj = 0.0069 are calibrated from the
empirical process for M2.
Data sources:
• Section 3: CPI inflation and GDP deflator, real GDP, government and private investment
shares are all from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2006); the own rate of M2 and
Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis (2006); the financial controls are from Beck and Levine (1999).
• Section 6.1: The growth rate of value added at 3-digit SIC level is from the UNIDO (2002)
industrial statistics database - the data are identical to the OECD-STAN (2003) data for
the US; the other data sources are as for Section 3.
• Section 6.2: The firm-level data employed on top of the aggregate data come from the
Compustat database; apart from the larger period of time covered, they coincide with the
data employed by Opler et al. (1999).
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Table 1: US aggregate quarterly and yearly data: Inflation & TFP-growth
unrestricted VAR
quarterly yearly quarterly yearly
dependent variable: TFP-growth dependent variable: inflation
L.TFP-growth -.0656 .0806 L.TFP-growth -.0572 -1.20∗∗
(-.56) (.22) (-.93) (-2.22)
L.inflation -.1761∗∗ -.2399∗∗∗ L.inflation .8486∗∗∗ .8760∗∗∗
(-2.24) (-2.76) (20.68) (6.81)
L.GDP-growth -.0727 -.2582 L.GDP-growth .0382 1.24∗∗∗
(-.81) (-1.12) (.82) (3.64)
L.inv-share -.1000∗∗∗ -.0231 L.inv-share .0289 -.1244
(-2.61) (-.13) (1.45) (-.46)
dependent variable: GDP-growth dependent variable: inv-share
L.TFP-growth -.6108∗∗∗ .6148 L.TFP-growth -.5447∗∗∗ .5393
(-4.00) (0.92) (-5.37) (1.30)
L.inflation -.2238∗∗ -.2596 L.inflation .0543 .0473
(-2.19) (-1.62) (.80) (.48)
L.GDP-growth .6053∗∗∗ -.3055 L.GDP-growth .5528∗∗∗ -.0866
(5.23) (-.72) (7.19) (-.33)
L.inv-share -.1335∗∗∗ -.0479 L.inv-share .8149∗∗∗ .5862∗∗∗
(-2.69) (-.14) (24.72) (2.83)
Granger causality test
quarterly yearly quarterly yearly
dependent variable: TFP-growth dependent variable: inflation
inflation 0.025∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ TFP-growth 0.351 0.026∗∗
GDP-growth 0.415 0.262 GDP-growth 0.412 0.000∗∗∗
inv-share 0.009∗∗∗ 0.899 inv-share 0.147 0.643
dependent variable: GDP-growth dependent variable: inv-share
TFP-growth 0.000∗∗∗ 0.360 TFP-growth 0.000∗∗∗ 0.195
inflation 0.028∗∗ 0.105 inflation 0.423 0.634
inv-share 0.007∗∗∗ 0.886 GDP-growth 0.000∗∗∗ 0.742
Lag length selection criteria
quarterly 167 Observations AIC: 4. lag HQIC: 1. lag SBIC: 1. lag
yearly 30 Observations AIC: 1. lag HQIC: 1. lag SBIC: 1. lag
We exclusively report the effects on TFP-growth. Always include a constant. 1960:1 - 2001:4 quarterly
and 1970-2000 yearly data. Endogenous variables: inflation, GDP-growth, private investment share.
Heteroscedasticity-robust s.e. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Test statistics are reported in p-values.
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Table 2: US aggregate yearly data: Inflation, corporate interest rates,
investment composition, corporate liquidity & TFP-growth
first stage1) first stage1)
TFP-growth R&D/assets TFP-growth liquidity/assets
OLS GMM-IV GMM-IV OLS OLS GMM-IV GMM-IV OLS
R&D/assets 2.04∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 2.66∗∗∗
(2.76) (2.92) (2.99)
liquidity/assets .7279∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 1.27∗
(2.53) (2.74) (1.94)
L.inflation -.0604∗∗∗ -.1643∗∗∗
(-3.20) (-3.07)
assets -.0045 -.0030 .0022∗∗∗ -.0040 -.0053 .0048∗∗
(-.96) (-.83) (2.71) (-.77) (-.98) (2.09)
oper. income -.0145 -.0023 .0050 -.0074 -.0005 .0015
(-.63) (-.16) (1.33) (-.73) (-.05) (.16)
long-debt .0273 .0108 -.0128∗∗∗ .0257 .0281 -.0277∗∗∗
(1.45) (.80) (-3.12) (1.19) (1.61) (-3.30)
inv-share .1792 .1083
(.89) (.61)
gov-share -1.61∗ -1.39
(-1.91) (-1.36)
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
1. serial-cor. .466 .464 .875 .219 .985 .495 .565 .065
2. serial-cor. .464 .503 .346 .328 .826 .318 .447 .620
Hansen-test - .694 .315 - - .742 .573 -
1) We exclusively show the results of the first stage regression for the first lag of inflation; the correlation coefficient
between inflation and corporate interest rates is 0.42.
Exog. variables (IVs): first and second lags of inflation and interest rates (Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield).
Additional exogenous control variables in the 1. and 2. stage for robustness check:
corporate assets, corporate operating income, corporate long-run debt, corporate interest expenditures.
Heteroscedasticity-robust s.e. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Null-hypothesis of well-specified model. Test statistics are reported in p-values.
Always include a constant. 1970 - 2000 yearly data.
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Table 3: US aggregate quarterly data: Inflation, corporate interest rates,
investment composition, corporate liquidity & TFP-growth
first stage1) first stage1)
TFP-growth R&D/assets TFP-growth liquidity/assets
OLS GMM-IV GMM-IV OLS OLS GMM-IV GMM-IV OLS
R&D/assets .5308∗∗ .8768∗ 1.01∗
(2.22) (1.73) (1.81)
liquidity/assets -.0025 .0365 .0481
(-.04) (1.05) (1.26)
L.inflation -.1861∗∗∗ -2.95∗∗∗
(-2.87) (-4.08)
assets .0001 .0006 -.0002 .0001 -.0002 .0120∗∗∗
(.08) (.44) (-.51) (.04) (-.11) (2.87)
oper. income -.0096 -.0207∗ .0151∗∗∗ -.0034 -.0045 -.0223
(-.86) (-1.94) (3.71) (-.29) (-.47) (-.64)
long-debt .0010 .0006 -.0006 .0009 .0029 -.0692∗∗∗
(.18) (.10) (-.34) (.16) (.46) (-3.57)
inv-share -.0004 -.0001
(-.56) (-.13)
gov-share .0052 .0028
(.70) (.39)
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
1. serial-cor. .303 .358 .331 .174 .551 .318 .325 .405
2. serial-cor. .869 .407 .369 .069 .930 .333 .646 .011
Hansen-test - .482 .555 - - .485 .490 -
1) We exclusively show the results of the first stage regression for the first lag of inflation; the correlation coefficient
between inflation and corporate interest rates is 0.55.
Exog. variables (IVs): first and second lags of inflation and interest rates (Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield).
Additional exogenous control variables in the 1. and 2. stage for robustness check:
corporate assets, corporate operating income, corporate long-run debt, corporate interest expenditures.
Heteroscedasticity-robust s.e. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Null-hypothesis of well-specified model. Test statistics are reported in p-values.
Always include a constant. 1960:1 - 2001:4 quarterly data.
Table 4: Calibrated parameter values
β σ µ γ αk αz δ θ φ Ω χ η
0.98 2 0.167 0.0037 0.31 0.31 0.0112 0.25 12.5 0.95 1.26 0.97
ζ ρ ρa σa ρv σv ρav ρj σj b µξ σξ
0.73 1.66 0.79 0.0075 0.66 0.0111 0.67 0.35 0.0069 0.15 -0.75 0.75
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Table 6: Steady state values and selected contemporaneous correlations
Friedman rule mg∗ = (1 + γ) mg∗ = 1.0167 mg∗ = 1.05 mg∗ = 1.1 mg∗ = 1.2
Variable pi∗ = −2.42 pi∗ = 0.00 pi∗ = 1.31 pi∗ = 4.74 pi∗ = 10.11 pi∗ = 21.69
R˜− 1 0.0000 0.0248 0.0383 0.0734 0.1284 0.2471
z/k 0.1450 0.1413 0.1393 0.1344 0.1271 0.1132
d 0.0359 0.0336 0.0325 0.0297 0.0260 0.0197
d/y 0.0921 0.0897 0.0887 0.0857 0.0815 0.0730
d/(d+ θwL) 0.3700 0.3658 0.3637 0.3578 0.3497 0.3314
G 0.8414 0.8330 0.8285 0.8165 0.7975 0.7563
yz/yk 0.1537 0.1483 0.1455 0.1381 0.1276 0.1077
T 0.9712 0.9672 0.9650 0.9593 0.9506 0.9321
ρ(R˜, T ) -0.49 -0.52 -0.53 -0.55 -0.57 -0.61
Statistics generated from simulated and Hodrick-Prescott filtered (smoothing parameter 1600) series
for the benchmark economy.
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Table 7: USA: Sectoral volatility and mean of growth in value added
Industries volatility ranking average growth ranking
Petroleum refineries 22.41135418 1 8.718858009 4
Non-ferrous metals 14.82056985 2 6.70920077 14
Iron and Steel 13.20761732 3 4.28101271 26
Wood products, except furniture 12.33161156 4 7.080945619 13
Professional & scientific equipment 11.82739193 5 9.520253349 3
Leather products 10.80728372 6 3.355740195 28
Industrial chemicals 9.80919931 7 6.565964224 17
Tobacco 9.466520079 8 9.765847611 2
Plastic products 9.047342577 9 11.40471846 1
Misc. petroleum and coal products 8.966026705 10 7.523389904 8
Transport equipment 8.93003486 11 6.708187212 15
Pottery, china, earthenware 8.753001453 12 6.344808742 18
Machinery, except electrical 8.447901686 13 7.217618028 11
Footwear, except rubber or plastic 7.94506906 14 0.592402327 29
Machinery, electric 7.771043776 15 7.865959786 6
Furniture, except metal 7.139279992 16 7.311662001 10
Paper and products 7.022639071 17 7.458034007 9
Other non-metallic mineral products 6.880040345 18 5.97226836 23
Textiles 6.602291836 19 5.229363677 25
Rubber products 6.212744352 20 5.399295643 24
Other manufacturing products 5.895932472 21 6.204043301 20
Glass and products 5.803579219 22 6.009918041 22
Wearing apparel, except footwear 5.515015898 23 3.865111854 27
Fabricated metal products 5.513984278 24 6.108224644 21
Total manufacturing 5.035217269 25 7.183158099 12
Printing and publishing 4.634205085 26 8.18032749 5
Beverages 4.122690753 27 6.238331092 19
Other chemicals 3.660652642 28 7.535671621 7
Food products 2.840748937 29 6.661717672 16
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Table 8: US sectoral yearly data:
Inflation-sensitivity with respect to volatility and mean of growth rate of value added
Growth rate of value added
full sample vol>med vol<med full sample full sample full sample full sample
inflation -.9632∗∗∗ -1.19∗∗ -.7390∗∗∗ -.8014∗∗∗ -.8107∗∗∗ -.8700∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗
(-4.20) (-2.69) (-5.83) (-3.84) (-3.73) (-3.51) (-4.25)
infl∗dvol -.3235∗ -.6167∗∗
(-1.65) (-2.58)
infl∗dmean -.1981 .2379
(-.97) (1.14)
GDP-growth 1.20∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗
(4.36) (2.67) (3.92) (4.36) (4.34) (4.36) (4.35)
L.GDP-growth -.7851∗∗∗ -.8938∗ -.6764∗∗∗ -.7851∗∗∗ -.7869∗∗∗ -.7839∗∗∗ -.7858∗∗∗
(-2.92) (-1.71) (-4.11) (-2.92) (-2.93) (-2.92) (-2.92)
credit -11.46∗∗∗ -15.01∗∗ -7.91∗∗∗ -11.46∗∗∗ -11.52∗∗∗ -11.42∗∗∗ -11.49∗∗∗
(-3.26) (-2.23) (3.86) (-3.26) (3.27) (3.52) (-3.27)
inv-share .5734∗∗ .8181 .3287 -.6305 .5734∗∗ .5720∗∗ .5741∗∗
(2.04) (1.55) (1.64) (2.04) (2.05) (2.03) (2.04)
Ind./Obs. 28/946 14/473 14/473 28/946 28/946 28/946 28/946
The correlation coefficient between the volatility- and mean rankings amounts to 0.23 (s.e. 0.03) according to
Spearman’s rank correlation test.
1963-2000 yearly data. Always include a constant. Heteroscedasticity- and serial correlation robust s.e.
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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Table 9: US firm-level quarterly data: Inflation, liquidity-holdings & R&D expenses
Corporate liquidity R&D expenses per firm
GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys1) GMM-sys GMM-sys1) GMM-sys
inflation -1.06 -.8556∗∗ -.4257 -11.74∗∗∗
(-1.10) (-2.08) (-1.01) (-2.81)
yield-corp-bonds -1.38∗∗ -.5967∗∗∗ -.3137
(-2.20) (-2.77) (-1.51)
corp. liquidity .0383∗∗∗ .0382∗∗∗
(2.73) (2.73)
assets .0138∗∗∗ .0138∗∗∗ .0129∗∗∗ .0091∗∗∗ .0129∗∗∗ .0091∗∗∗ .0015∗∗∗
(3.62) (3.62) (8.89) (5.01) (8.90) (5.01) (6.06)
spdrc -1.65
(-.79)
lag-dep.-var. .9013∗∗∗ .9012∗∗∗ -.0576 -.0783 -.0578 -.0785 -.0728∗∗
(14.77) (14.75) (-1.39) (-1.02) (-1.39) (-1.02) (-1.94)
Firms 5892 5892 6052 6052 6052 6052 425
Observations 115811 115811 121106 120730 121106 120730 7482
1. auto-cor. .998 .008 .012 .018 .012 .018 .007
2. auto-cor. .110 .110 .211 .140 .111 .140 .162
Hansen-test .464 .480 .125 .246 .113 .239 .697
1) The IV-matrix starts at the 4. lag since Hansen-test indicates that 2. and 3. lag endogenous.
Firm-level data on R&D expenses, corporate liquidity and total assets all measured in millions of US$.
1989:1-2000:4 quarterly data. Heteroscedasticity- and serial correlation robust s.e. t-statistics in parenthesis.
***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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Table 10: US firm-level yearly data: Inflation, liquidity holdings and R&D expenses
Corporate liquidity R&D expenses per firm spdrc < 12 spdrc ≥ 12
GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-dif GMM-dif GMM-sys GMM-sys1) GMM-sys GMM-sys
inflation -1.38∗∗ -.4707∗ -.3764∗ -3.721∗ -22.514∗∗
(-2.32) (-1.73) (-1.68) (-1.72) (-2.16)
yield-corp-bonds -1.61∗∗ -.0366 .0889
(-2.34) (-.34) (.88)
corp. liquidity .0353∗∗∗ .0486∗∗∗
(4.15) (4.20)
assets .0230∗∗ .0231∗∗ .0035∗∗ .0021 .0007 -.0010 -.0014 -.0008
(2.23) (2.25) (2.18) (1.48) (-1.19) (-1.57) (-.74) (-.24)
spdrc -99.1 -439.3∗∗
(-1.24) (-2.09)
lag-dep.-var. .7361∗∗∗ .7357∗∗∗ .8504 .8237 1.01 .9462 .1.00 .9289
(7.73) (7.77) (19.08) (17.73) (29.43) (21.00) (14.69) (7.52)
Firms 10903 10923 9705 9703 9742 10925 378 492
Observations 83468 84277 72009 71981 84355 84314 6217 5194
1. auto-cor. .002 .002 .001 .002 .001 .001 .017 .182
2. auto-cor. .468 .488 .604 .554 .616 .533 .519 .474
Hansen-test .238 .260 - - .075 .267 221 .274
1) The IV-matrix starts at the 4. lag since Hansen-test indicates that 2. and 3. lag endogenous.
Firm-level data on R&D expenses, corporate liquidity and total assets all measured in millions of US$.
1970-2000 yearly data. Heteroscedasticity- and serial correlation robust s.e. t-statistics in parenthesis.
***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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